75 ideas
| 2797 | As coherence expands its interrelations become steadily tighter, culminating only in necessary truth [Dancy,J] |
| 6267 | A culture needs to admit that knowledge is more extensive than just 'science' [Putnam] |
| 6272 | 'True' and 'refers' cannot be made scientically precise, but are fundamental to science [Putnam] |
| 6276 | 'The rug is green' might be warrantedly assertible even though the rug is not green [Putnam] |
| 6266 | We need the correspondence theory of truth to understand language and science [Putnam] |
| 2768 | The correspondence theory also has the problem that two sets of propositions might fit the facts equally well [Dancy,J] |
| 6277 | Correspondence between concepts and unconceptualised reality is impossible [Putnam] |
| 2769 | If one theory is held to be true, all the other theories appear false, because they can't be added to the true one [Dancy,J] |
| 2765 | Rescher says that if coherence requires mutual entailment, this leads to massive logical redundancy [Dancy,J] |
| 2766 | Even with a tight account of coherence, there is always the possibility of more than one set of coherent propositions [Dancy,J] |
| 6264 | In Tarski's definition, you understand 'true' if you accept the notions of the object language [Putnam] |
| 6265 | Tarski has given a correct account of the formal logic of 'true', but there is more to the concept [Putnam] |
| 6269 | Only Tarski has found a way to define 'true' [Putnam] |
| 6280 | Realism is a theory, which explains the convergence of science and the success of language [Putnam] |
| 2781 | Realism says that most perceived objects exist, and have some of their perceived properties [Dancy,J] |
| 2745 | A pupil who lacks confidence may clearly know something but not be certain of it [Dancy,J] |
| 2755 | If senses are fallible, then being open to correction is an epistemological virtue [Dancy,J] |
| 5677 | Naïve direct realists hold that objects retain all of their properties when unperceived [Dancy,J] |
| 5678 | Scientific direct realism says we know some properties of objects directly [Dancy,J] |
| 5681 | Maybe we are forced from direct into indirect realism by the need to explain perceptual error [Dancy,J] |
| 5683 | Indirect realism depends on introspection, the time-lag, illusions, and neuroscience [Dancy,J, by PG] |
| 5682 | Internal realism holds that we perceive physical objects via mental objects [Dancy,J] |
| 2778 | Phenomenalism includes possible experiences, but idealism only refers to actual experiences [Dancy,J] |
| 5684 | Eliminative idealists say there are no objects; reductive idealists say objects exist as complex experiences [Dancy,J] |
| 2777 | Extreme solipsism only concerns current experience, but it might include past and future [Dancy,J] |
| 2794 | Knowing that a cow is not a horse seems to be a synthetic a priori truth [Dancy,J] |
| 6284 | If a tautology is immune from revision, why would that make it true? [Putnam] |
| 2780 | Perception is either direct realism, indirect realism, or phenomenalism [Dancy,J] |
| 5679 | We can't grasp the separation of quality types, or what a primary-quality world would be like [Dancy,J] |
| 5680 | For direct realists the secondary and primary qualities seem equally direct [Dancy,J] |
| 2782 | We can be looking at distant stars which no longer actually exist [Dancy,J] |
| 2775 | It is not clear from the nature of sense data whether we should accept them as facts [Dancy,J] |
| 2784 | Appearances don't guarantee reality, unless the appearance is actually caused by the reality [Dancy,J] |
| 2785 | Perceptual beliefs may be directly caused, but generalisations can't be [Dancy,J] |
| 2788 | If perception and memory are indirect, then two things stand between mind and reality [Dancy,J] |
| 2787 | Memories aren't directly about the past, because time-lags and illusions suggest representation [Dancy,J] |
| 2791 | Phenomenalism about memory denies the past, or reduces it to present experience [Dancy,J] |
| 2790 | I can remember plans about the future, and images aren't essential (2+3=5) [Dancy,J] |
| 2754 | Foundations are justified by non-beliefs, or circularly, or they need no justification [Dancy,J] |
| 2749 | For internalists we must actually know that the fact caused the belief [Dancy,J] |
| 2770 | Internalists tend to favour coherent justification, but not the coherence theory of truth [Dancy,J] |
| 2752 | Foundationalism requires inferential and non-inferential justification [Dancy,J] |
| 2771 | Foundationalists must accept not only the basic beliefs, but also rules of inference for further progress [Dancy,J] |
| 2756 | If basic beliefs can be false, falsehood in non-basic beliefs might by a symptom [Dancy,J] |
| 2753 | Beliefs can only be infallible by having almost no content [Dancy,J] |
| 2773 | Coherentism gives a possible justification of induction, and opposes scepticism [Dancy,J] |
| 2779 | Idealists must be coherentists, but coherentists needn't be idealists [Dancy,J] |
| 2786 | For coherentists justification and truth are not radically different things [Dancy,J] |
| 2767 | If it is empirical propositions which have to be coherent, this eliminates coherent fiction [Dancy,J] |
| 2776 | Externalism could even make belief unnecessary (e.g. in animals) [Dancy,J] |
| 2746 | How can a causal theory of justification show that all men die? [Dancy,J] |
| 2747 | Causal theories don't allow for errors in justification [Dancy,J] |
| 6273 | Knowledge depends on believing others, which must be innate, as inferences are not strong enough [Putnam] |
| 6274 | Empathy may not give knowledge, but it can give plausibility or right opinion [Putnam] |
| 2772 | Coherentism moves us towards a more social, shared view of knowledge [Dancy,J] |
| 2743 | What is the point of arguing against knowledge, if being right undermines your own argument? [Dancy,J] |
| 2751 | Probabilities can only be assessed relative to some evidence [Dancy,J] |
| 17084 | You can't decide which explanations are good if you don't attend to the interest-relative aspects [Putnam] |
| 2757 | The argument from analogy rests on one instance alone [Dancy,J] |
| 2758 | You can't separate mind and behaviour, as the analogy argument attempts [Dancy,J] |
| 6282 | Theory of meaning presupposes theory of understanding and reference [Putnam] |
| 6281 | Truth conditions can't explain understanding a sentence, because that in turn needs explanation [Putnam] |
| 6278 | We should reject the view that truth is prior to meaning [Putnam] |
| 2744 | Verificationism (the 'verification principle') is an earlier form of anti-realism [Dancy,J] |
| 2760 | Logical positivism implies foundationalism, by dividing weak from strong verifications [Dancy,J] |
| 2761 | If the meanings of sentences depend on other sentences, how did we learn language? [Dancy,J] |
| 6271 | How reference is specified is not what reference is [Putnam] |
| 6268 | The claim that scientific terms are incommensurable can be blocked if scientific terms are not descriptions [Putnam] |
| 6279 | A private language could work with reference and beliefs, and wouldn't need meaning [Putnam] |
| 6270 | The correct translation is the one that explains the speaker's behaviour [Putnam] |
| 6283 | Language maps the world in many ways (because it maps onto other languages in many ways) [Putnam] |
| 2763 | There is an indeterminacy in juggling apparent meanings against probable beliefs [Dancy,J] |
| 6275 | You can't say 'most speaker's beliefs are true'; in some areas this is not so, and you can't count beliefs [Putnam] |
| 2762 | Charity makes native beliefs largely true, and Humanity makes them similar to ours [Dancy,J] |
| 7903 | The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna] |