Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Mahaprajnaparamitashastra', 'Grundgesetze der Arithmetik 1 (Basic Laws)' and 'Identity, Ostension, and Hypostasis'

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22 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 6. Metaphysics as Conceptual
11103 We aren't stuck with our native conceptual scheme; we can gradually change it [Quine]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / b. Definite descriptions
13733 Frege considered definite descriptions to be genuine singular terms [Frege, by Fitting/Mendelsohn]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 4. Substitutional Quantification
9874 Contradiction arises from Frege's substitutional account of second-order quantification [Dummett on Frege]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / g. Real numbers
18252 Real numbers are ratios of quantities, such as lengths or masses [Frege]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 1. Foundations for Mathematics
18271 We can't prove everything, but we can spell out the unproved, so that foundations are clear [Frege]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 5. Definitions of Number / c. Fregean numbers
10623 Frege defined number in terms of extensions of concepts, but needed Basic Law V to explain extensions [Frege, by Hale/Wright]
9975 Frege ignored Cantor's warning that a cardinal set is not just a concept-extension [Tait on Frege]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / a. Early logicism
18165 My Basic Law V is a law of pure logic [Frege]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 2. Processes
11092 A river is a process, with stages; if we consider it as one thing, we are considering a process [Quine]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 7. Abstract/Concrete / a. Abstract/concrete
11093 We don't say 'red' is abstract, unlike a river, just because it has discontinuous shape [Quine]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / a. Ontological commitment
11101 General terms don't commit us ontologically, but singular terms with substitution do [Quine]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 5. Category Anti-Realism
11096 Discourse generally departmentalizes itself to some degree [Quine]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 4. Concept Nominalism
11099 Understanding 'is square' is knowing when to apply it, not knowing some object [Quine]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 6. Mereological Nominalism
11094 'Red' is a single concrete object in space-time; 'red' and 'drop' are parts of a red drop [Quine]
11097 Red is the largest red thing in the universe [Quine]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 1. Concept of Identity
17595 To unite a sequence of ostensions to make one object, a prior concept of identity is needed [Quine]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 7. Indiscernible Objects
11095 We should just identify any items which are indiscernible within a given discourse [Quine]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / c. Fregean concepts
9190 A concept is a function mapping objects onto truth-values, if they fall under the concept [Frege, by Dummett]
13665 Frege took the study of concepts to be part of logic [Frege, by Shapiro]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 5. Concepts and Language / b. Concepts are linguistic
11104 Concepts are language [Quine]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 1. Abstract Thought
11102 Apply '-ness' or 'class of' to abstract general terms, to get second-level abstract singular terms [Quine]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
7903 The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna]