Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Mahaprajnaparamitashastra', 'On Sense and Reference' and 'Letters to Antoine Arnauld'

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76 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 1. Nature of Wisdom
Wisdom is the science of happiness [Leibniz]
1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 2. Wise People
Wise people have fewer acts of will, because such acts are linked together [Leibniz]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 5. Metaphysics beyond Science
Metaphysics is geometrical, resting on non-contradiction and sufficient reason [Leibniz]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 4. Real Definition
Definitions can only be real if the item is possible [Leibniz]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 1. Truth
A truth is just a proposition in which the predicate is contained within the subject [Leibniz]
The predicate is in the subject of a true proposition [Leibniz]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 5. Truth Bearers
Frege was strongly in favour of taking truth to attach to propositions [Frege, by Dummett]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / a. Names
We can treat designation by a few words as a proper name [Frege]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / b. Names as descriptive
A Fregean proper name has a sense determining an object, instead of a concept [Frege, by Sainsbury]
People may have different senses for 'Aristotle', like 'pupil of Plato' or 'teacher of Alexander' [Frege]
Proper name in modal contexts refer obliquely, to their usual sense [Frege, by Gibbard]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / c. Names as referential
The meaning of a proper name is the designated object [Frege]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / d. Singular terms
Frege ascribes reference to incomplete expressions, as well as to singular terms [Frege, by Hale]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / e. Empty names
If sentences have a 'sense', empty name sentences can be understood that way [Frege, by Sawyer]
It is a weakness of natural languages to contain non-denoting names [Frege]
In a logically perfect language every well-formed proper name designates an object [Frege]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 6. Intensionalism
Frege is intensionalist about reference, as it is determined by sense; identity of objects comes first [Frege, by Jacquette]
Frege moved from extensional to intensional semantics when he added the idea of 'sense' [Frege, by Sawyer]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / a. Units
There is no multiplicity without true units [Leibniz]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / g. Particular being
What is not truly one being is not truly a being either [Leibniz]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / a. Nature of supervenience
A thing 'expresses' another if they have a constant and fixed relationship [Leibniz]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 2. Powers as Basic
A substance contains the laws of its operations, and its actions come from its own depth [Leibniz]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 1. Universals
We can't get a semantics from nouns and predicates referring to the same thing [Frege, by Dummett]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / a. Intrinsic unification
Philosophy needs the precision of the unity given by substances [Leibniz]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / b. Unifying aggregates
Accidental unity has degrees, from a mob to a society to a machine or organism [Leibniz]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / c. Unity as conceptual
We find unity in reason, and unity in perception, but these are not true unity [Leibniz]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / a. Substance
A body is a unified aggregate, unless it has an indivisible substance [Leibniz]
Unity needs an indestructible substance, to contain everything which will happen to it [Leibniz]
Every bodily substance must have a soul, or something analogous to a soul [Leibniz]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / b. Need for substance
Aggregates don’t reduce to points, or atoms, or illusion, so must reduce to substance [Leibniz]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 1. Essences of Objects
Basic predicates give the complete concept, which then predicts all of the actions [Leibniz]
Essences exist in the divine understanding [Leibniz]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 6. Essence as Unifier
Bodies need a soul (or something like it) to avoid being mere phenomena [Leibniz]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 10. Essence as Species
Truths about species are eternal or necessary, but individual truths concern what exists [Leibniz]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 1. Concept of Identity
Frege was asking how identities could be informative [Frege, by Perry]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / a. Transworld identity
If varieties of myself can be conceived of as distinct from me, then they are not me [Leibniz]
If someone's life went differently, then that would be another individual [Leibniz]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 4. The Cogito
I cannot think my non-existence, nor exist without being myself [Leibniz]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 5. Cogito Critique
I can't just know myself to be a substance; I must distinguish myself from others, which is hard [Leibniz]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / a. Foundationalism
Nothing should be taken as certain without foundations [Leibniz]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / a. Types of explanation
Nature is explained by mathematics and mechanism, but the laws rest on metaphysics [Leibniz]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / k. Explanations by essence
To fully conceive the subject is to explain the resulting predicates and events [Leibniz]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / b. Purpose of mind
Mind is a thinking substance which can know God and eternal truths [Leibniz]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 7. Animal Minds
It seems probable that animals have souls, but not consciousness [Leibniz]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 7. Compatibilism
Everything which happens is not necessary, but is certain after God chooses this universe [Leibniz]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 1. Concepts / a. Nature of concepts
Concepts are what unite a proposition [Leibniz]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / c. Fregean concepts
'The concept "horse"' denotes a concept, yet seems also to denote an object [Frege, by McGee]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 4. Meaning as Truth-Conditions
Frege failed to show when two sets of truth-conditions are equivalent [Frege, by Potter]
The meaning (reference) of a sentence is its truth value - the circumstance of it being true or false [Frege]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 7. Meaning Holism / b. Language holism
Holism says all language use is also a change in the rules of language [Frege, by Dummett]
19. Language / B. Reference / 1. Reference theories
The reference of a word should be understood as part of the reference of the sentence [Frege]
19. Language / B. Reference / 4. Descriptive Reference / a. Sense and reference
Frege's Puzzle: from different semantics we infer different reference for two names with the same reference [Frege, by Fine,K]
Frege's 'sense' is ambiguous, between the meaning of a designator, and how it fixes reference [Kripke on Frege]
Every descriptive name has a sense, but may not have a reference [Frege]
Frege started as anti-realist, but the sense/reference distinction led him to realism [Frege, by Benardete,JA]
The meaning (reference) of 'evening star' is the same as that of 'morning star', but not the sense [Frege]
In maths, there are phrases with a clear sense, but no actual reference [Frege]
We are driven from sense to reference by our desire for truth [Frege]
19. Language / B. Reference / 4. Descriptive Reference / b. Reference by description
Expressions always give ways of thinking of referents, rather than the referents themselves [Frege, by Soames]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 5. Fregean Semantics
'Sense' gives meaning to non-referring names, and to two expressions for one referent [Frege, by Margolis/Laurence]
Frege was the first to construct a plausible theory of meaning [Frege, by Dummett]
Earlier Frege focuses on content itself; later he became interested in understanding content [Frege, by Dummett]
Frege divided the meaning of a sentence into sense, force and tone [Frege, by Dummett]
Frege uses 'sense' to mean both a designator's meaning, and the way its reference is determined [Kripke on Frege]
Frege explained meaning as sense, semantic value, reference, force and tone [Frege, by Miller,A]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 4. Beauty
Beauty increases with familiarity [Leibniz]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / a. Nature of happiness
Happiness is advancement towards perfection [Leibniz]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / g. Atomism
I think the corpuscular theory, rather than forms or qualities, best explains particular phenomena [Leibniz]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 1. Laws of Nature
Each possible world contains its own laws, reflected in the possible individuals of that world [Leibniz]
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 1. Mechanics / c. Forces
Motion alone is relative, but force is real, and establishes its subject [Leibniz]
28. God / B. Proving God / 3. Proofs of Evidence / e. Miracles
Everything, even miracles, belongs to order [Leibniz]
Miracles are extraordinary operations by God, but are nevertheless part of his design [Leibniz]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 2. Immortality / a. Immortality
Immortality without memory is useless [Leibniz]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 2. Immortality / b. Soul
The soul is indestructible and always self-aware [Leibniz]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 2. Immortality / c. Animal Souls
Animals have souls, but lack consciousness [Leibniz]