Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Mahaprajnaparamitashastra', 'Causal Relations' and 'Sophistical Refutations'

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15 ideas

1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 5. Linguistic Analysis
The best way to do ontology is to make sense of our normal talk [Davidson]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 1. On Reason
Didactic argument starts from the principles of the subject, not from the opinions of the learner [Aristotle]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 4. Aims of Reason
Reasoning is a way of making statements which makes them lead on to other statements [Aristotle]
2. Reason / C. Styles of Reason / 1. Dialectic
Dialectic aims to start from generally accepted opinions, and lead to a contradiction [Aristotle]
2. Reason / C. Styles of Reason / 3. Eristic
Competitive argument aims at refutation, fallacy, paradox, solecism or repetition [Aristotle]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / d. and
'Are Coriscus and Callias at home?' sounds like a single question, but it isn't [Aristotle]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / b. Events as primitive
If we don't assume that events exist, we cannot make sense of our common talk [Davidson]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 10. Essence as Species
Generic terms like 'man' are not substances, but qualities, relations, modes or some such thing [Aristotle]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 8. Leibniz's Law
Only if two things are identical do they have the same attributes [Aristotle]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / a. Explanation
Explanations typically relate statements, not events [Davidson]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 1. Causation
Distinguish causation, which is in the world, from explanations, which depend on descriptions [Davidson, by Schaffer,J]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / b. Causal relata
Either facts, or highly unspecific events, serve better as causes than concrete events [Field,H on Davidson]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / c. Conditions of causation
Full descriptions can demonstrate sufficiency of cause, but not necessity [Davidson]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / b. Nomological causation
A singular causal statement is true if it is held to fall under a law [Davidson, by Psillos]