31 ideas
14001 | People who use science to make philosophical points don't realise how philosophical science is [Markosian] |
4036 | What matters is not how many entities we postulate, but how many kinds of entities [Armstrong, by Mellor/Oliver] |
13991 | Presentism has the problem that if Socrates ceases to exist, so do propositions about him [Markosian] |
15754 | Without properties we would be unable to express the laws of nature [Armstrong] |
4034 | Whether we apply 'cold' or 'hot' to an object is quite separate from its change of temperature [Armstrong] |
8535 | To the claim that every predicate has a property, start by eliminating failure of application of predicate [Armstrong] |
8537 | Tropes fall into classes, because exact similarity is symmetrical and transitive [Armstrong] |
8538 | Trope theory needs extra commitments, to symmetry and non-transitivity, unless resemblance is exact [Armstrong] |
8539 | Universals are required to give a satisfactory account of the laws of nature [Armstrong] |
8529 | Deniers of properties and relations rely on either predicates or on classes [Armstrong] |
8532 | Resemblances must be in certain 'respects', and they seem awfully like properties [Armstrong] |
8530 | Change of temperature in objects is quite independent of the predicates 'hot' and 'cold' [Armstrong] |
8536 | We want to know what constituents of objects are grounds for the application of predicates [Armstrong] |
8531 | In most sets there is no property common to all the members [Armstrong] |
15753 | Essences might support Resemblance Nominalism, but they are too coarse and ill-defined [Armstrong] |
14002 | Possible worlds must be abstract, because two qualitatively identical worlds are just one world [Markosian] |
14000 | 'Grabby' truth conditions first select their object, unlike 'searchy' truth conditions [Markosian] |
8533 | Predicates need ontological correlates to ensure that they apply [Armstrong] |
4035 | There must be some explanation of why certain predicates are applicable to certain objects [Armstrong] |
7903 | The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna] |
8541 | Regularities theories are poor on causal connections, counterfactuals and probability [Armstrong] |
8540 | The introduction of sparse properties avoids the regularity theory's problem with 'grue' [Armstrong] |
13990 | Presentism is the view that only present objects exist [Markosian] |
13992 | Presentism says if objects don't exist now, we can't have attitudes to them or relations with them [Markosian] |
13994 | Presentism seems to entail that we cannot talk about other times [Markosian] |
13995 | Serious Presentism says things must exist to have relations and properties; Unrestricted version denies this [Markosian] |
13996 | Maybe Presentists can refer to the haecceity of a thing, after the thing itself disappears [Markosian] |
13997 | Maybe Presentists can paraphrase singular propositions about the past [Markosian] |
13993 | Special Relativity denies the absolute present which Presentism needs [Markosian] |
13998 | Objects in the past, like Socrates, are more like imaginary objects than like remote spatial objects [Markosian] |
13999 | People are mistaken when they think 'Socrates was a philosopher' says something [Markosian] |