Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Mahaprajnaparamitashastra', 'Truth-makers and dependence' and 'The Coherence Theory of Truth'

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19 ideas

3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 2. Truthmaker Relation
Truth-maker theory can't cope with non-causal dependence [Liggins]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 12. Rejecting Truthmakers
Truthmakers for existence is fine; otherwise maybe restrict it to synthetic truths? [Liggins]
For idealists reality is like a collection of beliefs, so truths and truthmakers are not distinct [Young,JO]
3. Truth / D. Coherence Truth / 1. Coherence Truth
Coherence theories differ over the coherence relation, and over the set of proposition with which to cohere [Young,JO]
Two propositions could be consistent with your set, but inconsistent with one another [Young,JO]
Coherence with actual beliefs, or our best beliefs, or ultimate ideal beliefs? [Young,JO]
Coherent truth is not with an arbitrary set of beliefs, but with a set which people actually do believe [Young,JO]
3. Truth / D. Coherence Truth / 2. Coherence Truth Critique
How do you identify the best coherence set; and aren't there truths which don't cohere? [Young,JO]
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 2. Deflationary Truth
Deflationary theories reject analysis of truth in terms of truth-conditions [Young,JO]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 5. Reason for Existence
Either p is true or not-p is true, so something is true, so something exists [Liggins]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / b. Relata of grounding
The dependence of {Socrates} on Socrates involves a set and a philosopher, not facts [Liggins]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 4. Ontological Dependence
Non-causal dependence is at present only dimly understood [Liggins]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / c. Significance of supervenience
Necessities supervene on everything, but don't depend on everything [Liggins]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / a. Explanation
'Because' can signal an inference rather than an explanation [Liggins]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / a. Types of explanation
Value, constitution and realisation are non-causal dependences that explain [Liggins]
If explanations track dependence, then 'determinative' explanations seem to exist [Liggins]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 4. Meaning as Truth-Conditions
Are truth-condtions other propositions (coherence) or features of the world (correspondence)? [Young,JO]
Coherence truth suggests truth-condtions are assertion-conditions, which need knowledge of justification [Young,JO]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna]