Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Mahaprajnaparamitashastra', 'Enquiry Conc Human Understanding' and 'Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus'

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186 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 1. Philosophy
What we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence [Wittgenstein]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 3. Philosophy Defined
I say (contrary to Wittgenstein) that philosophy expresses what we thought we must be silent about [Ansell Pearson on Wittgenstein]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 6. Hopes for Philosophy
If a question can be framed at all, it is also possible to answer it [Wittgenstein]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 7. Despair over Philosophy
The observation of human blindness and weakness is the result of all philosophy [Hume]
The 'Tractatus' is a masterpiece of anti-philosophy [Badiou on Wittgenstein]
This work solves all the main problems, but that has little value [Wittgenstein]
Once you understand my book you will see that it is nonsensical [Wittgenstein]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 4. Conceptual Analysis
If we suspect that a philosophical term is meaningless, we should ask what impression it derives from [Hume]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 5. Linguistic Analysis
Our language is an aspect of biology, and so its inner logic is opaque [Wittgenstein]
Most philosophical questions arise from failing to understand the logic of language [Wittgenstein]
The limits of my language means the limits of my world [Wittgenstein]
All complex statements can be resolved into constituents and descriptions [Wittgenstein]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 7. Limitations of Analysis
This book says we should either say it clearly, or shut up [Wittgenstein]
1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 1. Aims of Science
All experimental conclusions assume that the future will be like the past [Hume]
1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 3. Scientism
Science is all the true propositions [Wittgenstein]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 6. Ockham's Razor
If a sign is useless it is meaningless; that is the point of Ockham's maxim [Wittgenstein]
2. Reason / E. Argument / 3. Analogy
All reasoning concerning matters of fact is based on analogy (with similar results of similar causes) [Hume]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 2. Truthmaker Relation
The best account of truth-making is isomorphism [Wittgenstein, by Mulligan/Simons/Smith]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / c. States of affairs make truths
He says the world is the facts because it is the facts which fix all the truths [Wittgenstein, by Morris,M]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 11. Truthmaking and Correspondence
All truths have truth-makers, but only atomic truths correspond to them [Wittgenstein, by Rami]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 1. Correspondence Truth
Wittgenstein's picture theory is the best version of the correspondence theory of truth [Read on Wittgenstein]
Language is [propositions-elementary propositions-names]; reality is [facts-states of affairs-objects] [Wittgenstein, by Grayling]
The account of truth in the 'Tractatus' seems a perfect example of the correspondence theory [Wittgenstein, by O'Grady]
Pictures reach out to or feel reality, touching at the edges, correlating in its parts [Wittgenstein]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 2. Correspondence to Facts
Proposition elements correlate with objects, but the whole picture does not correspond to a fact [Wittgenstein, by Morris,M]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 1. Overview of Logic
Logic fills the world, to its limits [Wittgenstein]
Logic concerns everything that is subject to law; the rest is accident [Wittgenstein]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 3. Value of Logic
Wittgenstein is right that logic is just tautologies [Wittgenstein, by Russell]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 4. Pure Logic
Logic is a priori because it is impossible to think illogically [Wittgenstein]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 3. Deductive Consequence |-
If q implies p, that is justified by q and p, not by some 'laws' of inference [Wittgenstein]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 1. Ontology of Logic
The propositions of logic are analytic tautologies [Wittgenstein]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 2. Platonism in Logic
Wittgenstein convinced Russell that logic is tautologies, not Platonic forms [Wittgenstein, by Monk]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 3. Contradiction
Two colours in the same place is ruled out by the logical structure of colour [Wittgenstein]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 4. Identity in Logic
The sign of identity is not allowed in 'Tractatus' [Wittgenstein, by Bostock]
The identity sign is not essential in logical notation, if every sign has a different meaning [Wittgenstein, by Ramsey]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 1. Logical Form
Apparent logical form may not be real logical form [Wittgenstein]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / a. Logical connectives
My fundamental idea is that the 'logical constants' do not represent [Wittgenstein]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / c. not
'Not' isn't an object, because not-not-p would then differ from p [Wittgenstein]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 4. Variables in Logic
'Object' is a pseudo-concept, properly indicated in logic by the variable x [Wittgenstein]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / a. Names
Names are primitive, and cannot be analysed [Wittgenstein]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / c. Names as referential
A name is primitive, and its meaning is the object [Wittgenstein]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 1. Quantification
Wittgenstein tried unsuccessfully to reduce quantifiers to conjunctions and disjunctions [Wittgenstein, by Jacquette]
5. Theory of Logic / H. Proof Systems / 1. Proof Systems
Logical proof just explicates complicated tautologies [Wittgenstein]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 3. Logical Truth
Logical truths are just 'by-products' of the introduction rules for logical constants [Wittgenstein, by Hacking]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 1. Axiomatisation
Logic doesn't split into primitive and derived propositions; they all have the same status [Wittgenstein]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 5. Definitions of Number / a. Defining numbers
The concept of number is just what all numbers have in common [Wittgenstein]
A number is a repeated operation [Wittgenstein]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 6. Mathematics as Set Theory / b. Mathematics is not set theory
The theory of classes is superfluous in mathematics [Wittgenstein]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / a. Mathematical empiricism
Reason assists experience in discovering laws, and in measuring their application [Hume]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / d. Logicism critique
Wittgenstein hated logicism, and described it as a cancerous growth [Wittgenstein, by Monk]
The logic of the world is shown by tautologies in logic, and by equations in mathematics [Wittgenstein]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 1. Nature of Existence
The world is facts, not things. Facts determine the world, and the world divides into facts [Wittgenstein]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 4. Abstract Existence
We can't think about the abstract idea of triangles, but only of particular triangles [Hume]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 6. Fundamentals / d. Logical atoms
The 'Tractatus' is an extreme example of 'Logical Atomism' [Wittgenstein, by Grayling]
In atomic facts the objects hang together like chain links [Wittgenstein]
The structure of an atomic fact is how its objects combine; this possibility is its form [Wittgenstein]
If a proposition is elementary, no other elementary proposition contradicts it [Wittgenstein]
Analysis must end in elementary propositions, which are combinations of names [Wittgenstein]
Nothing can be inferred from an elementary proposition [Wittgenstein]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / a. Facts
Do his existent facts constitute the world, or determine the world? [Morris,M on Wittgenstein]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / d. Negative facts
The world is determined by the facts, and there are no further facts [Wittgenstein]
The existence of atomic facts is a positive fact, their non-existence a negative fact [Wittgenstein]
On white paper a black spot is a positive fact and a white spot a negative fact [Wittgenstein]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 2. Internal Relations
The order of numbers is an internal relation, not an external one [Wittgenstein]
A relation is internal if it is unthinkable that its object should not possess it [Wittgenstein]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 7. Against Powers
We cannot form an idea of a 'power', and the word is without meaning [Hume]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 1. Physical Objects
Objects are the substance of the world [Wittgenstein]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Simples
Objects are simple [Wittgenstein]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / a. Substance
Apart from the facts, there is only substance [Wittgenstein]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 9. Essence and Properties
To know an object we must know the form and content of its internal properties [Wittgenstein, by Potter]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 1. Concept of Identity
Identity is not a relation between objects [Wittgenstein]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 2. Defining Identity
You can't define identity by same predicates, because two objects with same predicates is assertable [Wittgenstein]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 5. Self-Identity
Two things can't be identical, and self-identity is an empty concept [Wittgenstein]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 3. Types of Necessity
The only necessity is logical necessity [Wittgenstein]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 6. Probability
We transfer the frequency of past observations to our future predictions [Hume]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 7. Chance
There is no such thing as chance [Hume]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 1. A Priori Necessary
The tautologies of logic show the logic of language and the world [Wittgenstein]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / a. Conceivable as possible
What is thinkable is possible [Wittgenstein]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / a. Possible worlds
Each thing is in a space of possible facts [Wittgenstein]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
Unlike the modern view of a set of worlds, Wittgenstein thinks of a structured manifold of them [Wittgenstein, by White,RM]
An imagined world must have something in common with the real world [Wittgenstein]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / a. Transworld identity
To know an object you must know all its possible occurrences [Wittgenstein]
The 'form' of an object is its possible roles in facts [Wittgenstein]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / d. Haecceitism
Two objects may only differ in being different [Wittgenstein]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / a. Beliefs
Belief is stronger, clearer and steadier than imagination [Hume]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / b. Elements of beliefs
Belief is just a particular feeling attached to ideas of objects [Hume]
Belief can't be a concept plus an idea, or we could add the idea to fictions [Hume]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / d. Cause of beliefs
'Natural beliefs' are unavoidable, whatever our judgements [Hume, by Strawson,G]
Beliefs are built up by resemblance, contiguity and causation [Hume]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 4. Solipsism
Strict solipsism is pure realism, with the self as a mere point in surrounding reality [Wittgenstein]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 2. Self-Evidence
If the truth doesn't follow from self-evidence, then self-evidence cannot justify a truth [Wittgenstein]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 5. A Priori Synthetic
The Tractatus aims to reveal the necessities, without appealing to synthetic a priori truths [Wittgenstein, by Morris,M]
There is no a priori order of things [Wittgenstein]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 8. A Priori as Analytic
Logic and maths can't say anything about the world, since, as tautologies, they are consistent with all realities [Wittgenstein, by Grayling]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 9. A Priori from Concepts
Relations of ideas are known by thought, independently from the world [Hume]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 10. A Priori as Subjective
Logic is a priori because we cannot think illogically [Wittgenstein]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 11. Denying the A Priori
No pictures are true a priori [Wittgenstein]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / e. Primary/secondary critique
If secondary qualities (e.g. hardness) are in the mind, so are primary qualities like extension [Hume]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 3. Representation
It never occurs to people that they only experience representations, not the real objects [Hume]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 1. Empiricism
All objects of enquiry are Relations of Ideas, or Matters of Fact [Hume]
All ideas are copies of impressions [Hume]
Impressions are our livelier perceptions, Ideas the less lively ones [Hume]
All reasoning about facts is causal; nothing else goes beyond memory and senses [Hume]
If books don't relate ideas or explain facts, commit them to the flames [Hume]
Hume is loose when he says perceptions of different strength are different species [Reid on Hume]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 2. Associationism
All ideas are connected by Resemblance, Contiguity in time or place, and Cause and Effect [Hume]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 4. Pro-Empiricism
Only madmen dispute the authority of experience [Hume]
We can only invent a golden mountain by combining experiences [Hume]
When definitions are pushed to the limit, only experience can make them precise [Hume]
We cannot form the idea of something we haven't experienced [Hume]
You couldn't reason at all if you lacked experience [Hume]
How could Adam predict he would drown in water or burn in fire? [Hume]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 5. Empiricism Critique
Hume mistakenly lumps sensations and perceptions together as 'impressions' [Scruton on Hume]
If a person had a gap in their experience of blue shades, they could imaginatively fill it in [Hume]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / c. Empirical foundations
Reasons for belief must eventually terminate in experience, or they are without foundation [Hume]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / f. Foundationalism critique
There is no certain supreme principle, or infallible rule of inference [Hume]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 7. Testimony
We think testimony matches reality because of experience, not some a priori connection [Hume]
Good testimony needs education, integrity, motive and agreement [Hume, by PG]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 1. Scepticism
Reason can never show that experiences are connected to external objects [Hume]
Mitigated scepticism draws attention to the limitations of human reason, and encourages modesty [Hume]
Doubts can't exist if they are inexpressible or unanswerable [Wittgenstein]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 2. Types of Scepticism
Mitigated scepticism sensibly confines our enquiries to the narrow capacity of human understanding [Hume]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 3. Illusion Scepticism
Examples of illusion only show that sense experience needs correction by reason [Hume]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 6. Scepticism Critique
It is a very extravagant aim of the sceptics to destroy reason and argument by means of reason and argument [Hume]
The main objection to scepticism is that no good can come of it [Hume]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 3. Instrumentalism
The 'Tractatus' is instrumentalist about laws of nature [Wittgenstein, by Armstrong]
14. Science / C. Induction / 2. Aims of Induction
Induction accepts the simplest law that fits our experiences [Wittgenstein]
We assume similar secret powers behind similar experiences, such as the nourishment of bread [Hume]
14. Science / C. Induction / 3. Limits of Induction
Fools, children and animals all learn from experience [Hume]
All inferences from experience are effects of custom, not reasoning [Hume]
Reason cannot show why reliable past experience should extend to future times and remote places [Hume]
Induction can't prove that the future will be like the past, since induction assumes this [Hume]
If we infer causes from repetition, this explains why we infer from a thousand objects what we couldn't infer from one [Hume]
14. Science / C. Induction / 4. Reason in Induction
Premises can support an argument without entailing it [Pollock/Cruz on Hume]
Hume just shows induction isn't deduction [Williams,M on Hume]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / e. Lawlike explanations
The modern worldview is based on the illusion that laws explain nature [Wittgenstein]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 7. Seeing Resemblance
A picture of a friend strengthens our idea of him, by resemblance [Hume]
General ideas are the connection by resemblance to some particular [Hume]
Hume does not distinguish real resemblances among degrees of resemblance [Shoemaker on Hume]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 8. Remembering Contiguity
When I am close to (contiguous with) home, I feel its presence more nearly [Hume]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 9. Perceiving Causation
Our awareness of patterns of causation is too important to be left to slow and uncertain reasoning [Hume]
An object made by a saint is the best way to produce thoughts of him [Hume]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 4. Presupposition of Self
The subject stands outside our understanding of the world [Wittgenstein]
16. Persons / E. Rejecting the Self / 4. Denial of the Self
The modern idea of the subjective soul is composite, and impossible [Wittgenstein]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 5. Against Free Will
The doctrine of free will arises from a false sensation we have of freedom in many actions [Hume]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 7. Compatibilism
Liberty is merely acting according to the will, which anyone can do if they are not in chains [Hume]
Hume makes determinism less rigid by removing the necessity from causation [Trusted on Hume]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 6. Judgement / b. Error
The form of a proposition must show why nonsense is unjudgeable [Wittgenstein]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 5. Concepts and Language / a. Concepts and language
What can be said is what can be thought, so language shows the limits of thought [Wittgenstein, by Grayling]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 2. Meaning as Mental
The 'form' of the picture is its possible combinations [Wittgenstein]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 4. Meaning as Truth-Conditions
To understand a proposition means to know what is the case if it is true [Wittgenstein]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 5. Meaning as Verification
Good philosophy asserts science, and demonstrates the meaninglessness of metaphysics [Wittgenstein]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 4. Compositionality
Propositions use old expressions for a new sense [Wittgenstein]
Propositions are understood via their constituents [Wittgenstein]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 2. Abstract Propositions / b. Propositions as possible worlds
Pictures are possible situations in logical space [Wittgenstein]
19. Language / F. Communication / 4. Private Language
Solipsism is correct, but can only be shown, not said, by the limits of my personal language [Wittgenstein]
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / a. Translation
We translate by means of proposition constituents, not by whole propositions [Wittgenstein]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / a. Will to Act
Only experience teaches us about our wills [Hume]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 4. Responsibility for Actions
Praise and blame can only be given if an action proceeds from a person's character and disposition [Hume]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / b. Defining ethics
Ethics cannot be put into words [Wittgenstein]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / g. Moral responsibility
If you deny all necessity and causation, then our character is not responsible for our crime [Hume]
Repentance gets rid of guilt, which shows that responsibility arose from the criminal principles in the mind [Hume]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / c. Objective value
The sense of the world must lie outside the world [Wittgenstein]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 3. Free speech
No government has ever suffered by being too tolerant of philosophy [Hume]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 2. Natural Purpose / b. Limited purposes
We can discover some laws of nature, but never its ultimate principles and causes [Hume]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 1. Causation
A priori it looks as if a cause could have absolutely any effect [Hume]
If a singular effect is studied, its cause can only be inferred from the types of events involved [Hume]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 7. Eliminating causation
Hume never even suggests that there is no such thing as causation [Hume, by Strawson,G]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / b. Causal relata
At first Hume said qualities are the causal entities, but later he said events [Hume, by Davidson]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / a. Constant conjunction
It is only when two species of thing are constantly conjoined that we can infer one from the other [Hume]
Hume says we can only know constant conjunctions, not that that's what causation IS [Hume, by Strawson,G]
In both of Hume's definitions, causation is extrinsic to the sequence of events [Psillos on Hume]
Hume's definition of cause as constantly joined thoughts can't cover undiscovered laws [Ayer on Hume]
A cause is either similar events following one another, or an experience always suggesting a second experience [Hume]
No causes can be known a priori, but only from experience of constant conjunctions [Hume]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / c. Counterfactual causation
Cause is where if the first object had not been, the second had not existed [Hume]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / d. Causal necessity
In observing causes we can never observe any necessary connections or binding qualities [Hume]
Hume never shows how a strong habit could generate the concept of necessity [Harré/Madden on Hume]
Hume's regularity theory of causation is epistemological; he believed in some sort of natural necessity [Hume, by Strawson,G]
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / b. Ontological Proof critique
It can never be a logical contradiction to assert the non-existence of something thought to exist [Hume]
28. God / B. Proving God / 3. Proofs of Evidence / c. Teleological Proof critique
You can't infer the cause to be any greater than its effect [Hume]
28. God / B. Proving God / 3. Proofs of Evidence / e. Miracles
To establish a miracle the falseness of the evidence must be a greater miracle than the claimed miraculous event [Hume]
A miracle violates laws which have been established by continuous unchanging experience, so should be ignored [Hume]
All experience must be against a supposed miracle, or it wouldn't be called 'a miracle' [Hume]
28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 4. God Reflects Humanity
The idea of an infinite, intelligent, wise and good God arises from augmenting the best qualities of our own minds [Hume]