Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Mahaprajnaparamitashastra', 'Properties' and 'Trees, Terms and Truth'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts


34 ideas

3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / a. What makes truths
If facts are the truthmakers, they are not in the world [Engelbretsen]
There are no 'falsifying' facts, only an absence of truthmakers [Engelbretsen]
4. Formal Logic / A. Syllogistic Logic / 1. Aristotelian Logic
Traditional term logic struggled to express relations [Engelbretsen]
4. Formal Logic / A. Syllogistic Logic / 3. Term Logic
Term logic rests on negated terms or denial, and that propositions are tied pairs [Engelbretsen]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 5. Conceptions of Set / e. Iterative sets
In the iterative conception of sets, they form a natural hierarchy [Swoyer]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 2. History of Logic
Was logic a branch of mathematics, or mathematics a branch of logic? [Engelbretsen]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 1. Logical Form
Logical syntax is actually close to surface linguistic form [Engelbretsen]
Logical Form explains differing logical behaviour of similar sentences [Swoyer]
Propositions can be analysed as pairs of terms glued together by predication [Engelbretsen]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / c. not
Standard logic only negates sentences, even via negated general terms or predicates [Engelbretsen]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 6. Criterion for Existence
Existence and nonexistence are characteristics of the world, not of objects [Engelbretsen]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / a. Nature of supervenience
Supervenience is nowadays seen as between properties, rather than linguistic [Swoyer]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 4. Anti-realism
Anti-realists can't explain different methods to measure distance [Swoyer]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / a. Facts
Facts are not in the world - they are properties of the world [Engelbretsen]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 4. Category Realism
Individuals are arranged in inclusion categories that match our semantics [Engelbretsen]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 1. Nature of Properties
Can properties have parts? [Swoyer]
If a property such as self-identity can only be in one thing, it can't be a universal [Swoyer]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 5. Natural Properties
There are only first-order properties ('red'), and none of higher-order ('coloured') [Swoyer]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 11. Properties as Sets
The best-known candidate for an identity condition for properties is necessary coextensiveness [Swoyer]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 1. Universals
Various attempts are made to evade universals being wholly present in different places [Swoyer]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 4. Concept Nominalism
Conceptualism says words like 'honesty' refer to concepts, not to properties [Swoyer]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 2. Abstract Objects / a. Nature of abstracta
If properties are abstract objects, then their being abstract exemplifies being abstract [Swoyer]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / e. Against possible worlds
One might hope to reduce possible worlds to properties [Swoyer]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 5. Empiricism Critique
Extreme empiricists can hardly explain anything [Swoyer]
18. Thought / C. Content / 8. Intension
Intensions are functions which map possible worlds to sets of things denoted by an expression [Swoyer]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / e. Concepts from exemplars
Research suggests that concepts rely on typical examples [Swoyer]
19. Language / B. Reference / 2. Denoting
Terms denote objects with properties, and statements denote the world with that property [Engelbretsen]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 3. Predicates
The F and G of logic cover a huge range of natural language combinations [Swoyer]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 1. Propositions
'Socrates is wise' denotes a sentence; 'that Socrates is wise' denotes a proposition [Engelbretsen]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 2. Abstract Propositions / a. Propositions as sense
Maybe a proposition is just a property with all its places filled [Swoyer]
19. Language / F. Communication / 3. Denial
Negating a predicate term and denying its unnegated version are quite different [Engelbretsen]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 4. Regularities / a. Regularity theory
If laws are mere regularities, they give no grounds for future prediction [Swoyer]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / a. Scientific essentialism
Two properties can have one power, and one property can have two powers [Swoyer]