Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Mahaprajnaparamitashastra', 'W.V. Quine' and 'Meinong on Complexes and Assumptions'

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28 ideas

3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 6. Making Negative Truths
21544 It seems that when a proposition is false, something must fail to subsist [Russell]
4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 1. Propositional Logic
8472 Sentential logic is consistent (no contradictions) and complete (entirely provable) [Orenstein]
4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 2. Tools of Propositional Logic / e. Axioms of PL
8476 Axiomatization simply picks from among the true sentences a few to play a special role [Orenstein]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 4. Alethic Modal Logic
8480 S4: 'poss that poss that p' implies 'poss that p'; S5: 'poss that nec that p' implies 'nec that p' [Orenstein]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 1. Set Theory
8474 Unlike elementary logic, set theory is not complete [Orenstein]
4. Formal Logic / G. Formal Mereology / 1. Mereology
8465 Mereology has been exploited by some nominalists to achieve the effects of set theory [Orenstein]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 2. Excluded Middle
21539 Excluded middle can be stated psychologically, as denial of p implies assertion of not-p [Russell]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 1. Quantification
8452 Traditionally, universal sentences had existential import, but were later treated as conditional claims [Orenstein]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 4. Substitutional Quantification
8475 The substitution view of quantification says a sentence is true when there is a substitution instance [Orenstein]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / b. Types of number
8454 The whole numbers are 'natural'; 'rational' numbers include fractions; the 'reals' include root-2 etc. [Orenstein]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / a. Early logicism
8473 The logicists held that is-a-member-of is a logical constant, making set theory part of logic [Orenstein]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 2. Realism
21538 If two people perceive the same object, the object of perception can't be in the mind [Russell]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 3. Proposed Categories
8458 Just individuals in Nominalism; add sets for Extensionalism; add properties, concepts etc for Intensionalism [Orenstein]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 1. Nature of Relations
21534 The only thing we can say about relations is that they relate [Russell]
21540 Relational propositions seem to be 'about' their terms, rather than about the relation [Russell]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 3. Objects in Thought
21536 When I perceive a melody, I do not perceive the notes as existing [Russell]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / c. Individuation by location
21535 Objects only exist if they 'occupy' space and time [Russell]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 5. Contingency
21533 Contingency arises from tensed verbs changing the propositions to which they refer [Russell]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 1. Perceptual Realism / b. Direct realism
21537 I assume we perceive the actual objects, and not their 'presentations' [Russell]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 5. Empiricism Critique
21532 Full empiricism is not tenable, but empirical investigation is always essential [Russell]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 1. Scientific Theory
8457 The Principle of Conservatism says we should violate the minimum number of background beliefs [Orenstein]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 6. Judgement / b. Error
21542 Do incorrect judgements have non-existent, or mental, or external objects? [Russell]
18. Thought / C. Content / 1. Content
21541 The complexity of the content correlates with the complexity of the object [Russell]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 10. Denial of Meanings
8477 People presume meanings exist because they confuse meaning and reference [Orenstein]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 3. Predicates
8471 Three ways for 'Socrates is human' to be true are nominalist, platonist, or Montague's way [Orenstein]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 1. Propositions
21543 If p is false, then believing not-p is knowing a truth, so negative propositions must exist [Russell]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 4. Mental Propositions
8484 If two people believe the same proposition, this implies the existence of propositions [Orenstein]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
7903 The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna]