15 ideas
| 2626 | A philosopher is outside any community of ideas [Wittgenstein] |
| 6950 | You can be rational with undetected or minor inconsistencies [Harman] |
| 6954 | A coherent conceptual scheme contains best explanations of most of your beliefs [Harman] |
| 10911 | Part-whole is the key relation among truth-makers [Mulligan/Simons/Smith] |
| 10909 | Truth-makers cannot be the designata of the sentences they make true [Mulligan/Simons/Smith] |
| 10906 | Moments (objects which cannot exist alone) may serve as truth-makers [Mulligan/Simons/Smith] |
| 10907 | The truth-maker for a sentence may not be unique, or may be a combination, or several separate items [Mulligan/Simons/Smith] |
| 10912 | Despite negative propositions, truthmakers are not logical complexes, but ordinary experiences [Mulligan/Simons/Smith] |
| 10908 | Correspondence has to invoke facts or states of affairs, just to serve as truth-makers [Mulligan/Simons/Smith] |
| 6569 | 'This sentence is false' sends us in a looping search for its proposition [Wittgenstein, by Fogelin] |
| 3790 | Causes of beliefs are irrelevant to their contents [Wittgenstein] |
| 6955 | Enumerative induction is inference to the best explanation [Harman] |
| 6952 | Induction is 'defeasible', since additional information can invalidate it [Harman] |
| 6953 | All reasoning is inductive, and deduction only concerns implication [Harman] |
| 6951 | Ordinary rationality is conservative, starting from where your beliefs currently are [Harman] |