Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Truth-makers', 'Mathematical logic and theory of types' and 'There is no a Priori'

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18 ideas

3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 2. Truthmaker Relation
10911 Part-whole is the key relation among truth-makers [Mulligan/Simons/Smith]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / a. What makes truths
10909 Truth-makers cannot be the designata of the sentences they make true [Mulligan/Simons/Smith]
10906 Moments (objects which cannot exist alone) may serve as truth-makers [Mulligan/Simons/Smith]
10907 The truth-maker for a sentence may not be unique, or may be a combination, or several separate items [Mulligan/Simons/Smith]
10912 Despite negative propositions, truthmakers are not logical complexes, but ordinary experiences [Mulligan/Simons/Smith]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 3. Correspondence Truth critique
10908 Correspondence has to invoke facts or states of affairs, just to serve as truth-makers [Mulligan/Simons/Smith]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 8. Critique of Set Theory
11064 Classes can be reduced to propositional functions [Russell, by Hanna]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 5. Paradoxes in Set Theory / d. Russell's paradox
6407 The class of classes which lack self-membership leads to a contradiction [Russell, by Grayling]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / b. Type theory
10418 Type theory seems an extreme reaction, since self-exemplification is often innocuous [Swoyer on Russell]
10047 Russell's improvements blocked mathematics as well as paradoxes, and needed further axioms [Russell, by Musgrave]
23478 Type theory means that features shared by different levels cannot be expressed [Morris,M on Russell]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / c. Neo-logicism
21718 Ramified types can be defended as a system of intensional logic, with a 'no class' view of sets [Russell, by Linsky,B]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 10. Constructivism / d. Predicativism
18126 A set does not exist unless at least one of its specifications is predicative [Russell, by Bostock]
18128 Russell is a conceptualist here, saying some abstracta only exist because definitions create them [Russell, by Bostock]
18124 Vicious Circle says if it is expressed using the whole collection, it can't be in the collection [Russell, by Bostock]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 4. A Priori as Necessities
9354 Why should necessities only be knowable a priori? That Hesperus is Phosporus is known empirically [Devitt]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 9. A Priori from Concepts
9353 We explain away a priori knowledge, not as directly empirical, but as indirectly holistically empirical [Devitt]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 11. Denying the A Priori
9356 The idea of the a priori is so obscure that it won't explain anything [Devitt]