Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Evidentialism' and 'Action, Reasons and Causes'

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14 ideas

7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / b. Events as primitive
7949 Varied descriptions of an event will explain varied behaviour relating to it [Davidson, by Macdonald,C]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 6. Constitution of an Object
6019 If someone squashed a horse to make a dog, something new would now exist [Mnesarchus]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / a. Beliefs
8808 Involuntary beliefs can still be evaluated [Feldman/Conee]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 3. Evidentialism / b. Evidentialism
8807 Evidentialism is the view that justification is determined by the quality of the evidence [Feldman/Conee]
8809 Beliefs should fit evidence, and if you ought to believe it, then you are justified [Feldman/Conee]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / a. Reliable knowledge
8810 If someone rejects good criticism through arrogance, that is irrelevant to whether they have knowledge [Feldman/Conee]
20. Action / A. Definition of Action / 2. Duration of an Action
20020 If one action leads directly to another, they are all one action [Davidson, by Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 1. Intention to Act / a. Nature of intentions
20072 We explain an intention by giving an account of acting with an intention [Davidson, by Stout,R]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 2. Acting on Beliefs / a. Acting on beliefs
20045 Acting for a reason is a combination of a pro attitude, and a belief that the action is appropriate [Davidson]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / c. Reasons as causes
23734 The best explanation of reasons as purposes for actions is that they are causal [Davidson, by Smith,M]
23737 Reasons can give purposes to actions, without actually causing them [Smith,M on Davidson]
20075 Early Davidson says intentional action is caused by reasons [Davidson, by Stout,R]
6664 Reasons must be causes when agents act 'for' reasons [Davidson, by Lowe]
3395 Davidson claims that what causes an action is the reason for doing it [Davidson, by Kim]