18 ideas
18365 | If truths are just identical with facts, then truths will make themselves true [David] |
18362 | Examples show that truth-making is just non-symmetric, not asymmetric [David] |
18360 | It is assumed that a proposition is necessarily true if its truth-maker exists [David] |
18358 | Two different propositions can have the same fact as truth-maker [David] |
18355 | What matters is truth-making (not truth-makers) [David] |
18354 | Correspondence is symmetric, while truth-making is taken to be asymmetric [David] |
18356 | Correspondence is an over-ambitious attempt to explain truth-making [David] |
18363 | Correspondence theorists see facts as the only truth-makers [David] |
18364 | Correspondence theory likes ideal languages, that reveal the structure of propositions [David] |
18357 | What makes a disjunction true is simpler than the disjunctive fact it names [David] |
18359 | One proposition can be made true by many different facts [David] |
18361 | A reflexive relation entails that the relation can't be asymmetric [David] |
6019 | If someone squashed a horse to make a dog, something new would now exist [Mnesarchus] |
12580 | Experiences have no conceptual content [Evans, by Greco] |
7643 | We have far fewer colour concepts than we have discriminations of colour [Evans] |
23794 | Some representational states, like perception, may be nonconceptual [Evans, by Schulte] |
16366 | The Generality Constraint says if you can think a predicate you can apply it to anything [Evans] |
12575 | Concepts have a 'Generality Constraint', that we must know how predicates apply to them [Evans, by Peacocke] |