Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Reference and Necessity' and 'Letter to Menoeceus'

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28 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 2. Invocation to Philosophy
14052 Begin philosophy when you are young, and keep going when you are old [Epicurus]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / c. Names as referential
16405 To understand a name (unlike a description) picking the thing out is sufficient? [Stalnaker]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 7. Substratum
16407 Possible worlds allow separating all the properties, without hitting a bare particular [Stalnaker]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / a. Possible worlds
16397 If it might be true, it might be true in particular ways, and possible worlds describe such ways [Stalnaker]
16398 Possible worlds allow discussion of modality without controversial modal auxiliaries [Stalnaker]
16399 Possible worlds are ontologically neutral, but a commitment to possibilities remains [Stalnaker]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
16396 Kripke's possible worlds are methodological, not metaphysical [Stalnaker]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / b. Rigid designation
16408 Rigid designation seems to presuppose that differing worlds contain the same individuals [Stalnaker]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 6. Determinism / b. Fate
14062 Sooner follow mythology, than accept the 'fate' of natural philosophers [Epicurus]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 7. Compatibilism
1837 We should not refer things to irresponsible necessity, but either to fortune or to our own will [Epicurus]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 1. Meaning
16406 If you don't know what you say you can't mean it; what people say usually fits what they mean [Stalnaker]
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / b. Causal reference
16404 In the use of a name, many individuals are causally involved, but they aren't all the referent [Stalnaker]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 2. Semantics
16403 'Descriptive' semantics gives a system for a language; 'foundational' semantics give underlying facts [Stalnaker]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 6. Truth-Conditions Semantics
16401 To understand an utterance, you must understand what the world would be like if it is true [Stalnaker]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / a. Practical reason
1836 Prudence is more valuable than philosophy, because it avoids confusions of the soul [Epicurus]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 4. Responsibility for Actions
14061 Our own choices are autonomous, and the basis for praise and blame [Epicurus]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / e. Death
14055 The wisdom that produces a good life also produces a good death [Epicurus]
14054 Fearing death is absurd, because we are not present when it occurs [Epicurus]
14053 It is absurd to fear the pain of death when you are not even facing it [Epicurus]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / f. Good as pleasure
1833 Pleasure is the first good in life [Epicurus]
14057 All pleasures are good, but it is not always right to choose them [Epicurus]
14058 Pleasure is the goal, but as lack of pain and calm mind, not as depraved or greedy pleasure [Epicurus]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / i. Moral luck
14063 Sooner a good decision going wrong, than a bad one turning out for the good [Epicurus]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / d. Routes to happiness
14059 The best life is not sensuality, but rational choice and healthy opinion [Epicurus]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / a. Nature of pleasure
1835 True pleasure is not debauchery, but freedom from physical and mental pain [Epicurus]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / c. Value of pleasure
14056 We only need pleasure when we have the pain of desire [Epicurus]
23. Ethics / A. Egoism / 1. Ethical Egoism
3031 The greatest good is not the achievement of desire, but to desire what is proper [Menedemus, by Diog. Laertius]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / b. Basis of virtue
14060 Prudence is the greatest good, and more valuable than philosophy, because it produces virtue [Epicurus]