Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Gorgias' and 'The Inessential Indexical'

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46 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 7. Despair over Philosophy
Is a gifted philosopher unmanly if he avoids the strife of the communal world? [Plato]
2. Reason / C. Styles of Reason / 2. Elenchus
In "Gorgias" Socrates is confident that his 'elenchus' will decide moral truth [Vlastos on Plato]
We should test one another, by asking and answering questions [Plato]
2. Reason / E. Argument / 1. Argument
A 'teepee' argument has several mutually supporting planks to it [Cappelen/Dever]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 2. Knowing the Self
Prioprioception focuses on your body parts, not on your self, or indexicality [Cappelen/Dever]
We can acquire self-knowledge with mirrors, not just with proprioception and introspection [Cappelen/Dever]
Proprioception is only immune from error if you are certain that it represents the agent [Cappelen/Dever]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 1. Functionalism
Folk Functionalism is a Ramsification of our folk psychology [Cappelen/Dever]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 9. Indexical Thought
It is assumed that indexical content is needed to represent the perspective of perception [Cappelen/Dever]
All information is objective, and purely indexical information is not much use [Cappelen/Dever]
If some of our thought is tied to its context, it will be hard to communicate it [Cappelen/Dever]
You don't remember your house interior just from an experienced viewpoint [Cappelen/Dever]
Our beliefs and desires are not organised around ourselves, but around the world [Cappelen/Dever]
Indexicality is not significantly connected to agency [Cappelen/Dever]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 5. Fregean Semantics
Fregeans can't agree on what 'senses' are [Cappelen/Dever]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 8. Possible Worlds Semantics
Possible worlds accounts of content are notoriously coarse-grained [Cappelen/Dever]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 9. Indexical Semantics
Indexicals are just non-constant in meaning, and don't involve any special concepts [Cappelen/Dever]
Fregeans say 'I' differs in reference, so it must also differ in sense [Cappelen/Dever]
All indexicals can be expressed non-indexically [Cappelen/Dever]
19. Language / F. Communication / 1. Rhetoric
Rhetoric is irrational about its means and its ends [Plato]
Rhetoric can produce conviction, but not educate people about right and wrong [Plato]
19. Language / F. Communication / 5. Pragmatics / a. Contextual meaning
The basic Kaplan view is that there is truth-conditional content, and contextual character [Cappelen/Dever]
It is proposed that a huge range of linguistic items are context-sensitive [Cappelen/Dever]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 1. Intention to Act / b. Types of intention
All activity aims at the good [Plato]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 2. Acting on Beliefs / b. Action cognitivism
We deny that action involves some special class of beliefs [Cappelen/Dever]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / g. Will to power
Moral rules are made by the weak members of humanity [Plato]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / h. Fine deeds
A good person is bound to act well, and this brings happiness [Plato]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / i. Self-interest
Is it natural to simply indulge our selfish desires? [Plato]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / f. Good as pleasure
In slaking our thirst the goodness of the action and the pleasure are clearly separate [Plato]
Good should be the aim of pleasant activity, not the other way round [Plato]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / e. Role of pleasure
Good and bad people seem to experience equal amounts of pleasure and pain [Plato]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / f. Dangers of pleasure
If happiness is the satisfaction of desires, then a life of scratching itches should be happiness [Plato]
In a fool's mind desire is like a leaky jar, insatiable in its desires, and order and contentment are better [Plato]
23. Ethics / A. Egoism / 1. Ethical Egoism
The greatest good is not the achievement of desire, but to desire what is proper [Menedemus, by Diog. Laertius]
23. Ethics / A. Egoism / 2. Hedonism
Is the happiest state one of sensual, self-indulgent freedom? [Plato]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / c. Motivation for virtue
Should we avoid evil because it will bring us bad consequences? [Plato]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / e. Character
I would rather be a victim of crime than a criminal [Plato]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / b. Temperance
Self-indulgent desire makes friendship impossible, because it makes a person incapable of co-operation [Plato]
If absence of desire is happiness, then nothing is happier than a stone or a corpse [Plato]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / c. Justice
A criminal is worse off if he avoids punishment [Plato]
Do most people praise self-discipline and justice because they are too timid to gain their own pleasure? [Plato]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 4. External Goods / b. Health
The popular view is that health is first, good looks second, and honest wealth third [Plato]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 1. Purpose of a State
As with other things, a good state is organised and orderly [Plato]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / c. Direct democracy
A good citizen won't be passive, but will redirect the needs of the state [Plato]
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 1. Grounds of equality
Do most people like equality because they are second-rate? [Plato]
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 4. Economic equality
Does nature imply that it is right for better people to have greater benefits? [Plato]