15 ideas
7920 | Descriptive metaphysics aims at actual structure, revisionary metaphysics at a better structure [Strawson,P] |
7922 | Descriptive metaphysics concerns unchanging core concepts and categories [Strawson,P] |
7921 | Close examination of actual word usage is the only sure way in philosophy [Strawson,P] |
7440 | Secondary qualities are microscopic primary qualities of physical things [Armstrong] |
9282 | I can only apply consciousness predicates to myself if I can apply them to others [Strawson,P] |
7437 | Consciousness and experience of qualities are not the same [Armstrong] |
9263 | A person is an entity to which we can ascribe predicates of consciousness and corporeality [Strawson,P] |
7434 | Behaviourism is false, but mind is definable as the cause of behaviour [Armstrong] |
7436 | The manifestations of a disposition need never actually exist [Armstrong] |
7429 | Causal Functionalism says mental states are apt for producing behaviour [Armstrong] |
7438 | A causal theory of mentality would be improved by a teleological element [Armstrong] |
7431 | The identity of mental states with physical properties is contingent, because the laws of nature are contingent [Armstrong] |
7432 | One mental role might be filled by a variety of physical types [Armstrong] |
9281 | The idea of a predicate matches a range of things to which it can be applied [Strawson,P] |
3031 | The greatest good is not the achievement of desire, but to desire what is proper [Menedemus, by Diog. Laertius] |