15 ideas
| 6259 | Why can't a wise man doubt everything? [Montaigne] |
| 6263 | No wisdom could make us comfortably walk a wide beam if it was high in the air [Montaigne] |
| 6258 | Virtue is the distinctive mark of truth, and its greatest product [Montaigne] |
| 10631 | If 'x is heterological' iff it does not apply to itself, then 'heterological' is heterological if it isn't heterological [Hale/Wright] |
| 10624 | The incompletability of formal arithmetic reveals that logic also cannot be completely characterized [Hale/Wright] |
| 10629 | If structures are relative, this undermines truth-value and objectivity [Hale/Wright] |
| 10628 | The structural view of numbers doesn't fit their usage outside arithmetical contexts [Hale/Wright] |
| 10622 | The neo-Fregean is more optimistic than Frege about contextual definitions of numbers [Hale/Wright] |
| 6262 | We lack some sense or other, and hence objects may have hidden features [Montaigne] |
| 10626 | Objects just are what singular terms refer to [Hale/Wright] |
| 6260 | Sceptics say there is truth, but no means of making or testing lasting judgements [Montaigne] |
| 6261 | The soul is in the brain, as shown by head injuries [Montaigne] |
| 10630 | Abstracted objects are not mental creations, but depend on equivalence between given entities [Hale/Wright] |
| 10627 | Many conceptual truths ('yellow is extended') are not analytic, as derived from logic and definitions [Hale/Wright] |
| 3031 | The greatest good is not the achievement of desire, but to desire what is proper [Menedemus, by Diog. Laertius] |