Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'In Defence of Pure Reason' and 'Mental Acts: their content and their objects'

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32 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 1. Philosophy
Philosophy is a priori if it is anything [Bonjour]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 3. Pure Reason
Perceiving necessary connections is the essence of reasoning [Bonjour]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 6. Coherence
Coherence can't be validated by appeal to coherence [Bonjour]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 10. Properties as Predicates
Attributes are functions, not objects; this distinguishes 'square of 2' from 'double of 2' [Geach]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 9. Sameness
Being 'the same' is meaningless, unless we specify 'the same X' [Geach]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 1. Possibility
The concept of possibility is prior to that of necessity [Bonjour]
12. Knowledge Sources / C. Rationalism / 1. Rationalism
Moderate rationalists believe in fallible a priori justification [Bonjour]
Our rules of thought can only be judged by pure rational insight [Bonjour]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / d. Rational foundations
A priori justification can vary in degree [Bonjour]
A priori justification requires understanding but no experience [Bonjour]
You can't explain away a priori justification as analyticity, and you can't totally give it up [Bonjour]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / f. Foundationalism critique
The induction problem blocks any attempted proof of physical statements [Bonjour]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 1. External Justification
Externalist theories of justification don't require believers to have reasons for their beliefs [Bonjour]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 10. Anti External Justification
Externalism means we have no reason to believe, which is strong scepticism [Bonjour]
14. Science / C. Induction / 2. Aims of Induction
Induction must go beyond the evidence, in order to explain why the evidence occurred [Bonjour]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 3. Abstraction by mind
A big flea is a small animal, so 'big' and 'small' cannot be acquired by abstraction [Geach]
We cannot learn relations by abstraction, because their converse must be learned too [Geach]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 2. Potential Behaviour
You can't define real mental states in terms of behaviour that never happens [Geach]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 4. Behaviourism Critique
Beliefs aren't tied to particular behaviours [Geach]
18. Thought / C. Content / 1. Content
All thought represents either properties or indexicals [Bonjour]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 2. Origin of Concepts / a. Origin of concepts
The mind does not lift concepts from experience; it creates them, and then applies them [Geach]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 5. Concepts and Language / c. Concepts without language
If someone has aphasia but can still play chess, they clearly have concepts [Geach]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 3. Abstracta by Ignoring
'Abstractionism' is acquiring a concept by picking out one experience amongst a group [Geach]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 8. Abstractionism Critique
'Or' and 'not' are not to be found in the sensible world, or even in the world of inner experience [Geach]
We can't acquire number-concepts by extracting the number from the things being counted [Geach]
Abstractionists can't explain counting, because it must precede experience of objects [Geach]
The numbers don't exist in nature, so they cannot have been abstracted from there into our languages [Geach]
Blind people can use colour words like 'red' perfectly intelligently [Geach]
If 'black' and 'cat' can be used in the absence of such objects, how can such usage be abstracted? [Geach]
We can form two different abstract concepts that apply to a single unified experience [Geach]
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / b. Indeterminate translation
Indeterminacy of translation is actually indeterminacy of meaning and belief [Bonjour]
23. Ethics / A. Egoism / 1. Ethical Egoism
The greatest good is not the achievement of desire, but to desire what is proper [Menedemus, by Diog. Laertius]