Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Vagueness, Truth and Logic' and 'Notebooks 1914-1916'

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21 ideas

1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 5. Linguistic Analysis
Analysis complicates a statement, but only as far as the complexity of its meaning [Wittgenstein]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 6. Logical Analysis
Study vagueness first by its logic, then by its truth-conditions, and then its metaphysics [Fine,K]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 1. Overview of Logic
We can dispense with self-evidence, if language itself prevents logical mistakes [Jeshion on Wittgenstein]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 2. Excluded Middle
Excluded Middle, and classical logic, may fail for vague predicates [Fine,K]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 1. Logical Form
A statement's logical form derives entirely from its constituents [Wittgenstein]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / a. Logical connectives
'And' and 'not' are non-referring terms, which do not represent anything [Wittgenstein, by Fogelin]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 3. Logical Truth
Logic holding between indefinite sentences is the core of all language [Fine,K]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 6. Fundamentals / d. Logical atoms
The sense of propositions relies on the world's basic logical structure [Wittgenstein]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / d. Vagueness as linguistic
Vagueness is semantic, a deficiency of meaning [Fine,K]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / e. Higher-order vagueness
A thing might be vaguely vague, giving us higher-order vagueness [Fine,K]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / f. Supervaluation for vagueness
A vague sentence is only true for all ways of making it completely precise [Fine,K]
Logical connectives cease to be truth-functional if vagueness is treated with three values [Fine,K]
Meaning is both actual (determining instances) and potential (possibility of greater precision) [Fine,K]
With the super-truth approach, the classical connectives continue to work [Fine,K]
Borderline cases must be under our control, as capable of greater precision [Fine,K]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / e. Vague objects
Vagueness can be in predicates, names or quantifiers [Fine,K]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 5. A Priori Synthetic
My main problem is the order of the world, and whether it is knowable a priori [Wittgenstein]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 4. Presupposition of Self
The philosophical I is the metaphysical subject, the limit - not a part of the world [Wittgenstein]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 2. Meaning as Mental
Propositions assemble a world experimentally, like the model of a road accident [Wittgenstein]
23. Ethics / A. Egoism / 1. Ethical Egoism
The greatest good is not the achievement of desire, but to desire what is proper [Menedemus, by Diog. Laertius]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 4. Suicide
Absolute prohibitions are the essence of ethics, and suicide is the most obvious example [Wittgenstein]