12 ideas
7746 | We don't normally think of names as having senses (e.g. we don't give definitions of them) [Searle] |
7747 | How can a proper name be correlated with its object if it hasn't got a sense? [Searle] |
7748 | 'Aristotle' means more than just 'an object that was christened "Aristotle"' [Searle] |
7749 | Reference for proper names presupposes a set of uniquely referring descriptions [Searle] |
7750 | Proper names are logically connected with their characteristics, in a loose way [Searle] |
20475 | Maybe modal sentences cannot be true or false [Casullo] |
20476 | If the necessary is a priori, so is the contingent, because the same evidence is involved [Casullo] |
20471 | Epistemic a priori conditions concern either the source, defeasibility or strength [Casullo] |
20477 | The main claim of defenders of the a priori is that some justifications are non-experiential [Casullo] |
20472 | Analysis of the a priori by necessity or analyticity addresses the proposition, not the justification [Casullo] |
20474 | 'Overriding' defeaters rule it out, and 'undermining' defeaters weaken in [Casullo] |
3031 | The greatest good is not the achievement of desire, but to desire what is proper [Menedemus, by Diog. Laertius] |