16 ideas
| 15647 | Truth definitions don't produce a good theory, because they go beyond your current language [Halbach] |
| 15649 | In semantic theories of truth, the predicate is in an object-language, and the definition in a metalanguage [Halbach] |
| 15648 | Instead of a truth definition, add a primitive truth predicate, and axioms for how it works [Halbach] |
| 15655 | Should axiomatic truth be 'conservative' - not proving anything apart from implications of the axioms? [Halbach] |
| 15654 | If truth is defined it can be eliminated, whereas axiomatic truth has various commitments [Halbach] |
| 15650 | Axiomatic theories of truth need a weak logical framework, and not a strong metatheory [Halbach] |
| 15656 | Deflationists say truth merely serves to express infinite conjunctions [Halbach] |
| 15657 | To prove the consistency of set theory, we must go beyond set theory [Halbach] |
| 15652 | We can use truth instead of ontologically loaded second-order comprehension assumptions about properties [Halbach] |
| 15651 | Instead of saying x has a property, we can say a formula is true of x - as long as we have 'true' [Halbach] |
| 17644 | Metaphysical realism is committed to there being one ultimate true theory [Putnam] |
| 17648 | It is an illusion to think there could be one good scientific theory of reality [Putnam] |
| 17643 | Shape is essential relative to 'statue', but not essential relative to 'clay' [Putnam] |
| 17642 | The old view that sense data are independent of mind is quite dotty [Putnam] |
| 3031 | The greatest good is not the achievement of desire, but to desire what is proper [Menedemus, by Diog. Laertius] |
| 17645 | An alien might think oxygen was the main cause of a forest fire [Putnam] |