Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Review of Aron 'Our Knowledge of Universals'' and 'The Limits of Contingency'

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15 ideas

4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / c. Axiom of Pairing II
Pairing (with Extensionality) guarantees an infinity of sets, just from a single element [Rosen]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 4. Impossible objects
A Meinongian principle might say that there is an object for any modest class of properties [Rosen]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 5. Metaphysical Necessity
'Metaphysical' modality is the one that makes the necessity or contingency of laws of nature interesting [Rosen]
Metaphysical necessity is absolute and universal; metaphysical possibility is very tolerant [Rosen]
Standard Metaphysical Necessity: P holds wherever the actual form of the world holds [Rosen]
Sets, universals and aggregates may be metaphysically necessary in one sense, but not another [Rosen]
Non-Standard Metaphysical Necessity: when ¬P is incompatible with the nature of things [Rosen]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 6. Logical Necessity
Something may be necessary because of logic, but is that therefore a special sort of necessity? [Rosen]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 3. Combinatorial possibility
Combinatorial theories of possibility assume the principles of combination don't change across worlds [Rosen]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / a. Conceivable as possible
A proposition is 'correctly' conceivable if an ominiscient being could conceive it [Rosen]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 2. Origin of Concepts / a. Origin of concepts
We reach concepts by clarification, or by definition, or by habitual experience [Price,HH]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 2. Abstracta by Selection
A 'felt familiarity' with universals is more primitive than abstraction [Price,HH]
Our understanding of 'dog' or 'house' arises from a repeated experience of concomitances [Price,HH]
23. Ethics / A. Egoism / 1. Ethical Egoism
The greatest good is not the achievement of desire, but to desire what is proper [Menedemus, by Diog. Laertius]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 4. Regularities / b. Best system theory
The MRL view says laws are the theorems of the simplest and strongest account of the world [Rosen]