17 ideas
| 8378 | Philosophers usually learn science from each other, not from science [Russell] |
| 17325 | Truth-maker theory can't cope with non-causal dependence [Liggins] |
| 17318 | Truthmakers for existence is fine; otherwise maybe restrict it to synthetic truths? [Liggins] |
| 17320 | Either p is true or not-p is true, so something is true, so something exists [Liggins] |
| 17326 | The dependence of {Socrates} on Socrates involves a set and a philosopher, not facts [Liggins] |
| 17327 | Non-causal dependence is at present only dimly understood [Liggins] |
| 17322 | Necessities supervene on everything, but don't depend on everything [Liggins] |
| 8375 | 'Necessary' is a predicate of a propositional function, saying it is true for all values of its argument [Russell] |
| 17324 | 'Because' can signal an inference rather than an explanation [Liggins] |
| 17321 | Value, constitution and realisation are non-causal dependences that explain [Liggins] |
| 17323 | If explanations track dependence, then 'determinative' explanations seem to exist [Liggins] |
| 3031 | The greatest good is not the achievement of desire, but to desire what is proper [Menedemus, by Diog. Laertius] |
| 4396 | The law of causality is a source of confusion, and should be dropped from philosophy [Russell] |
| 8376 | If causes are contiguous with events, only the last bit is relevant, or the event's timing is baffling [Russell] |
| 8380 | Striking a match causes its igniting, even if it sometimes doesn't work [Russell] |
| 8379 | In causal laws, 'events' must recur, so they have to be universals, not particulars [Russell] |
| 8381 | The constancy of scientific laws rests on differential equations, not on cause and effect [Russell] |