10 ideas
| 15545 | Armstrong's analysis seeks truthmakers rather than definitions [Lewis] |
| 15546 | Predications aren't true because of what exists, but of how it exists [Lewis] |
| 15548 | Say 'truth is supervenient on being', but construe 'being' broadly [Lewis] |
| 14399 | Presentism says only the present exists, so there is nothing for tensed truths to supervene on [Lewis] |
| 15543 | How do things combine to make states of affairs? Constituents can repeat, and fail to combine [Lewis] |
| 18430 | We accept properties because of type/tokens, reference, and quantification [Edwards] |
| 18432 | Quineans say that predication is primitive and inexplicable [Edwards] |
| 18437 | Resemblance nominalism requires a second entity to explain 'the rose is crimson' [Edwards] |
| 18434 | That a whole is prior to its parts ('priority monism') is a view gaining in support [Edwards] |
| 3031 | The greatest good is not the achievement of desire, but to desire what is proper [Menedemus, by Diog. Laertius] |