Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'A Future for Presentism' and 'Apriority as an Evaluative Notion'

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22 ideas

2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 2. Sufficient Reason
14018 Is Sufficient Reason self-refuting (no reason to accept it!), or is it a legitimate explanatory tool? [Bourne]
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 4. Circularity
9161 Maybe reasonableness requires circular justifications - that is one coherentist view [Field,H]
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 1. Redundant Truth
14008 The redundancy theory conflates metalinguistic bivalence with object-language excluded middle [Bourne]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 1. Nature of Relations
14009 It is a necessary condition for the existence of relations that both of the relata exist [Bourne]
14010 All relations between spatio-temporal objects are either spatio-temporal, or causal [Bourne]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 6. A Priori from Reason
9160 Lots of propositions are default reasonable, but the a priori ones are empirically indefeasible [Field,H]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 7. A Priori from Convention
9164 We treat basic rules as if they were indefeasible and a priori, with no interest in counter-evidence [Field,H]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / a. Reliable knowledge
9165 Reliability only makes a rule reasonable if we place a value on the truth produced by reliable processes [Field,H]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / b. Anti-reliabilism
9162 Believing nothing, or only logical truths, is very reliable, but we want a lot more than that [Field,H]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 6. Contextual Justification / a. Contextualism
9166 People vary in their epistemological standards, and none of them is 'correct' [Field,H]
14. Science / C. Induction / 1. Induction
9163 If we only use induction to assess induction, it is empirically indefeasible, and hence a priori [Field,H]
23. Ethics / A. Egoism / 1. Ethical Egoism
3031 The greatest good is not the achievement of desire, but to desire what is proper [Menedemus, by Diog. Laertius]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 1. Relativity / a. Special relativity
14016 The idea of simultaneity in Special Relativity is full of verificationist assumptions [Bourne]
14019 Relativity denies simultaneity, so it needs past, present and future (unlike Presentism) [Bourne]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / a. Absolute time
14013 Special Relativity allows an absolute past, future, elsewhere and simultaneity [Bourne]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / g. Growing block
14015 No-Futurists believe in past and present, but not future, and say the world grows as facts increase [Bourne]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / h. Presentism
14007 How can presentists talk of 'earlier than', and distinguish past from future? [Bourne]
14011 Presentism seems to deny causation, because the cause and the effect can never coexist [Bourne]
14017 Since presentists treat the presentness of events as basic, simultaneity should be define by that means [Bourne]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / d. Time series
14003 Time is tensed or tenseless; the latter says all times and objects are real, and there is no passage of time [Bourne]
14005 B-series objects relate to each other; A-series objects relate to the present [Bourne]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / e. Tensed (A) series
14006 Time flows, past is fixed, future is open, future is feared but not past, we remember past, we plan future [Bourne]