13 ideas
| 9161 | Maybe reasonableness requires circular justifications - that is one coherentist view [Field,H] |
| 13949 | All models of Peano axioms are isomorphic, so the models all seem equally good for natural numbers [Cartwright,R on Peano] |
| 18113 | PA concerns any entities which satisfy the axioms [Peano, by Bostock] |
| 17634 | Peano axioms not only support arithmetic, but are also fairly obvious [Peano, by Russell] |
| 15653 | We can add Reflexion Principles to Peano Arithmetic, which assert its consistency or soundness [Halbach on Peano] |
| 17635 | Arithmetic can have even simpler logical premises than the Peano Axioms [Russell on Peano] |
| 9160 | Lots of propositions are default reasonable, but the a priori ones are empirically indefeasible [Field,H] |
| 9164 | We treat basic rules as if they were indefeasible and a priori, with no interest in counter-evidence [Field,H] |
| 604 | Knowledge is mind and knowing 'cohabiting' [Lycophron, by Aristotle] |
| 9165 | Reliability only makes a rule reasonable if we place a value on the truth produced by reliable processes [Field,H] |
| 9162 | Believing nothing, or only logical truths, is very reliable, but we want a lot more than that [Field,H] |
| 9166 | People vary in their epistemological standards, and none of them is 'correct' [Field,H] |
| 9163 | If we only use induction to assess induction, it is empirically indefeasible, and hence a priori [Field,H] |