15 ideas
| 17954 | Essence is a thing's necessities, but what about its possibilities (which may not be realised)? [Vetter] |
| 17953 | Real definition fits abstracta, but not individual concrete objects like Socrates [Vetter] |
| 17952 | Modal accounts make essence less mysterious, by basing them on the clearer necessity [Vetter] |
| 17959 | Metaphysical necessity is even more deeply empirical than Kripke has argued [Vetter] |
| 17955 | Possible worlds allow us to talk about degrees of possibility [Vetter] |
| 17957 | Maybe possibility is constituted by potentiality [Vetter] |
| 17958 | The apparently metaphysically possible may only be epistemically possible [Vetter] |
| 17956 | Closeness of worlds should be determined by the intrinsic nature of relevant objects [Vetter] |
| 604 | Knowledge is mind and knowing 'cohabiting' [Lycophron, by Aristotle] |
| 23681 | The first motion or effect cannot be produced necessarily, so the First Cause must be a free agent [Reid] |
| 23676 | A willed action needs reasonable understanding of what is to be done [Reid] |
| 23680 | We are morally free, because we experience it, we are accountable, and we pursue projects [Reid] |
| 23678 | A motive is merely an idea, like advice, and not a force for action [Reid] |
| 23677 | We all know that mere priority or constant conjunction do not have to imply causation [Reid] |
| 23679 | The principle of the law of nature is that matter is passive, and is acted upon [Reid] |