Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'The Fixation of Belief' and 'Truth Rehabilitated'

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25 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 3. Metaphysical Systems
6947 Metaphysics does not rest on facts, but on what we are inclined to believe [Peirce]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 4. Aims of Reason
6937 Reason aims to discover the unknown by thinking about the known [Peirce]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 3. Value of Truth
23291 Without truth, both language and thought are impossible [Davidson]
23284 Plato's Forms confused truth with the most eminent truths, so only Truth itself is completely true [Davidson]
23286 Truth can't be a goal, because we can neither recognise it nor confim it [Davidson]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 1. Correspondence Truth
23292 Correspondence can't be defined, but it shows how truth depends on the world [Davidson]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / c. Meta-language for truth
23288 When Tarski defines truth for different languages, how do we know it is a single concept? [Davidson]
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 2. Deflationary Truth
23287 Disquotation only accounts for truth if the metalanguage contains the object language [Davidson]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 2. Realism
21492 Realism is basic to the scientific method [Peirce]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 4. Anti-realism
6949 If someone doubted reality, they would not actually feel dissatisfaction [Peirce]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / e. Facts rejected
23285 If we try to identify facts precisely, they all melt into one (as the Slingshot Argument proves) [Davidson]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 8. Transcendental Necessity
490 Everything happens by reason and necessity [Leucippus]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / c. Aim of beliefs
6940 The feeling of belief shows a habit which will determine our actions [Peirce]
6941 We are entirely satisfied with a firm belief, even if it is false [Peirce]
6942 We want true beliefs, but obviously we think our beliefs are true [Peirce]
6943 A mere question does not stimulate a struggle for belief; there must be a real doubt [Peirce]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 2. Pragmatic justification
6598 We need our beliefs to be determined by some external inhuman permanency [Peirce]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / b. Basic beliefs
6944 Demonstration does not rest on first principles of reason or sensation, but on freedom from actual doubt [Peirce]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 1. External Justification
6948 Doubts should be satisfied by some external permanency upon which thinking has no effect [Peirce]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 6. Scepticism Critique
6945 Once doubt ceases, there is no point in continuing to argue [Peirce]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 4. Meaning as Truth-Conditions
23289 Knowing the potential truth conditions of a sentence is necessary and sufficient for understanding [Davidson]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 6. Meaning as Use
23290 It could be that the use of a sentence is explained by its truth conditions [Davidson]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 2. Defining Kinds
6939 What is true of one piece of copper is true of another (unlike brass) [Peirce]
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 3. Evolution
6938 Natural selection might well fill an animal's mind with pleasing thoughts rather than true ones [Peirce]
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / d. Pascal's Wager
6946 If death is annihilation, belief in heaven is a cheap pleasure with no disappointment [Peirce]