19 ideas
| 18696 | The vagueness of truthmaker claims makes it easier to run anti-realist arguments [Button] |
| 19081 | Coherence with a set of propositions suggests we can know the proposition corresponds [Davidson, by Donnellan] |
| 18701 | The coherence theory says truth is coherence of thoughts, and not about objects [Button] |
| 18694 | Permutation Theorem: any theory with a decent model has lots of models [Button] |
| 18692 | Realists believe in independent objects, correspondence, and fallibility of all theories [Button] |
| 18693 | Indeterminacy arguments say if a theory can be made true, it has multiple versions [Button] |
| 18695 | An ideal theory can't be wholly false, because its consistency implies a true model [Button] |
| 8806 | The concepts of belief and truth are linked, since beliefs are meant to fit reality [Davidson] |
| 8252 | Davidson believes experience is non-conceptual, and outside the space of reasons [Davidson, by McDowell] |
| 8255 | Davidson says the world influences us causally; I say it influences us rationally [McDowell on Davidson] |
| 8804 | Reasons for beliefs are not the same as evidence [Davidson] |
| 8802 | Sensations lack the content to be logical; they cause beliefs, but they cannot justify them [Davidson] |
| 8801 | Coherent justification says only beliefs can be reasons for holding other beliefs [Davidson] |
| 18700 | Cartesian scepticism doubts what is true; Kantian scepticism doubts that it is sayable [Button] |
| 8805 | Skepticism is false because our utterances agree, because they are caused by the same objects [Davidson] |
| 18698 | Predictions give the 'content' of theories, which can then be 'equivalent' or 'adequate' [Button] |
| 18697 | A sentence's truth conditions are all the situations where it would be true [Button] |
| 18703 | Davidson's Cogito: 'I think, therefore I am generally right' [Davidson, by Button] |
| 467 | A virtue is a combination of intelligence, strength and luck [Ion] |