50 ideas
11147 | Naturalistic philosophers oppose analysis, preferring explanation to a priori intuition [Margolis/Laurence] |
18194 | 'Forcing' can produce new models of ZFC from old models [Maddy] |
18195 | A Large Cardinal Axiom would assert ever-increasing stages in the hierarchy [Maddy] |
18191 | Axiom of Infinity: completed infinite collections can be treated mathematically [Maddy] |
18193 | The Axiom of Foundation says every set exists at a level in the set hierarchy [Maddy] |
18169 | Axiom of Reducibility: propositional functions are extensionally predicative [Maddy] |
18168 | 'Propositional functions' are propositions with a variable as subject or predicate [Maddy] |
18171 | Cantor and Dedekind brought completed infinities into mathematics [Maddy] |
18190 | Completed infinities resulted from giving foundations to calculus [Maddy] |
18175 | For any cardinal there is always a larger one (so there is no set of all sets) [Maddy] |
18196 | An 'inaccessible' cardinal cannot be reached by union sets or power sets [Maddy] |
18172 | Infinity has degrees, and large cardinals are the heart of set theory [Maddy] |
18187 | Theorems about limits could only be proved once the real numbers were understood [Maddy] |
18182 | The extension of concepts is not important to me [Maddy] |
18177 | In the ZFC hierarchy it is impossible to form Frege's set of all three-element sets [Maddy] |
18164 | Frege solves the Caesar problem by explicitly defining each number [Maddy] |
18163 | Mathematics rests on the logic of proofs, and on the set theoretic axioms [Maddy] |
18185 | Unified set theory gives a final court of appeal for mathematics [Maddy] |
18183 | Set theory brings mathematics into one arena, where interrelations become clearer [Maddy] |
18186 | Identifying geometric points with real numbers revealed the power of set theory [Maddy] |
18184 | Making set theory foundational to mathematics leads to very fruitful axioms [Maddy] |
18188 | The line of rationals has gaps, but set theory provided an ordered continuum [Maddy] |
18204 | Scientists posit as few entities as possible, but set theorist posit as many as possible [Maddy] |
18207 | Maybe applications of continuum mathematics are all idealisations [Maddy] |
18167 | We can get arithmetic directly from HP; Law V was used to get HP from the definition of number [Maddy] |
18205 | The theoretical indispensability of atoms did not at first convince scientists that they were real [Maddy] |
11141 | Modern empiricism tends to emphasise psychological connections, not semantic relations [Margolis/Laurence] |
18206 | Science idealises the earth's surface, the oceans, continuities, and liquids [Maddy] |
11142 | Body-type seems to affect a mind's cognition and conceptual scheme [Margolis/Laurence] |
11121 | Language of thought has subject/predicate form and includes logical devices [Margolis/Laurence] |
11120 | Concepts are either representations, or abilities, or Fregean senses [Margolis/Laurence] |
11122 | A computer may have propositional attitudes without representations [Margolis/Laurence] |
11124 | Do mental representations just lead to a vicious regress of explanations [Margolis/Laurence] |
11123 | Maybe the concept CAT is just the ability to discriminate and infer about cats [Margolis/Laurence] |
11125 | The abilities view cannot explain the productivity of thought, or mental processes [Margolis/Laurence] |
11140 | Concept-structure explains typicality, categories, development, reference and composition [Margolis/Laurence] |
11128 | Classically, concepts give necessary and sufficient conditions for falling under them [Margolis/Laurence] |
11129 | The classical theory explains acquisition, categorization and reference [Margolis/Laurence] |
11130 | Typicality challenges the classical view; we see better fruit-prototypes in apples than in plums [Margolis/Laurence] |
11131 | It may be that our concepts (such as 'knowledge') have no definitional structure [Margolis/Laurence] |
11134 | People don't just categorise by apparent similarities [Margolis/Laurence] |
11136 | Many complex concepts obviously have no prototype [Margolis/Laurence] |
11133 | Prototype theory categorises by computing the number of shared constituents [Margolis/Laurence] |
11135 | Complex concepts have emergent properties not in the ingredient prototypes [Margolis/Laurence] |
11132 | The prototype theory is probabilistic, picking something out if it has sufficient of the properties [Margolis/Laurence] |
11137 | The theory theory of concepts says they are parts of theories, defined by their roles [Margolis/Laurence] |
11138 | The theory theory is holistic, so how can people have identical concepts? [Margolis/Laurence] |
11139 | Maybe concepts have no structure, and determined by relations to the world, not to other concepts [Margolis/Laurence] |
11146 | People can formulate new concepts which are only named later [Margolis/Laurence] |
467 | A virtue is a combination of intelligence, strength and luck [Ion] |