17 ideas
| 19125 | If we define truth, we can eliminate it [Halbach/Leigh] |
| 19128 | If a language cannot name all objects, then satisfaction must be used, instead of unary truth [Halbach/Leigh] |
| 19120 | Semantic theories need a powerful metalanguage, typically including set theory [Halbach/Leigh] |
| 19127 | The T-sentences are deductively weak, and also not deductively conservative [Halbach/Leigh] |
| 19124 | A natural theory of truth plays the role of reflection principles, establishing arithmetic's soundness [Halbach/Leigh] |
| 19126 | If deflationary truth is not explanatory, truth axioms should be 'conservative', proving nothing new [Halbach/Leigh] |
| 19129 | The FS axioms use classical logical, but are not fully consistent [Halbach/Leigh] |
| 19130 | KF is formulated in classical logic, but describes non-classical truth, which allows truth-value gluts [Halbach/Leigh] |
| 19121 | We can reduce properties to true formulas [Halbach/Leigh] |
| 19122 | Nominalists can reduce theories of properties or sets to harmless axiomatic truth theories [Halbach/Leigh] |
| 23146 | Motives produce intentions, which lead to actions [Driver] |
| 467 | A virtue is a combination of intelligence, strength and luck [Ion] |
| 23147 | Good intentions are not necessary for virtue [Driver] |
| 23144 | Virtue should be defined by consequences, not by states of mind [Driver] |
| 23148 | Virtues are character traits or dispositions which produce good consequences for others [Driver] |
| 23150 | Control of pregnancy and knowledge of paternity have downgraded chastity [Driver] |
| 23149 | If generosity systematically turned recipients into parasites, it wouldn't be a virtue [Driver] |