Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', '(Nonsolipsistic) Conceptual Role Semantics' and 'Lewis: reduction of mind (on himself)'

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29 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 6. Coherence
Reasoning aims at increasing explanatory coherence [Harman]
Reason conservatively: stick to your beliefs, and prefer reasoning that preserves most of them [Harman]
2. Reason / E. Argument / 1. Argument
Arguments are nearly always open to challenge, but they help to explain a position rather than force people to believe [Lewis]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 1. Overview of Logic
We have a theory of logic (implication and inconsistency), but not of inference or reasoning [Harman]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / d. and
I might accept P and Q as likely, but reject P-and-Q as unlikely [Harman]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 2. Reduction
The whole truth supervenes on the physical truth [Lewis]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / b. Types of supervenience
Where pixels make up a picture, supervenience is reduction [Lewis]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 3. Reality
Reality is the overlap of true complete theories [Harman]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / b. Purpose of mind
A mind is an organ of representation [Lewis]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 6. Anti-Individualism
There is no natural border between inner and outer [Harman]
We can only describe mental attitudes in relation to the external world [Harman]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / c. Explaining qualia
The way things look is a relational matter, not an intrinsic matter [Harman]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind
Human pain might be one thing; Martian pain might be something else [Lewis]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 2. Reduction of Mind
I am a reductionist about mind because I am an a priori reductionist about everything [Lewis]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 4. Folk Psychology
Folk psychology makes good predictions, by associating mental states with causal roles [Lewis]
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 4. Language of Thought
Folk psychology doesn't say that there is a language of thought [Lewis]
18. Thought / C. Content / 6. Broad Content
If you don't share an external world with a brain-in-a-vat, then externalism says you don't share any beliefs [Lewis]
Nothing shows that all content is 'wide', or that wide content has logical priority [Lewis]
A spontaneous duplicate of you would have your brain states but no experience, so externalism would deny him any beliefs [Lewis]
Wide content derives from narrow content and relationships with external things [Lewis]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 5. Concepts and Language / a. Concepts and language
Concepts in thought have content, but not meaning, which requires communication [Harman]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 6. Meaning as Use
Take meaning to be use in calculation with concepts, rather than in communication [Harman]
The use theory attaches meanings to words, not to sentences [Harman]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 7. Meaning Holism / c. Meaning by Role
Meaning from use of thoughts, constructed from concepts, which have a role relating to reality [Harman]
Some regard conceptual role semantics as an entirely internal matter [Harman]
The content of thought is relations, between mental states, things in the world, and contexts [Harman]
19. Language / F. Communication / 3. Denial
If one proposition negates the other, which is the negative one? [Harman]
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / a. Translation
Mastery of a language requires thinking, and not just communication [Harman]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / a. Nature of virtue
A virtue is a combination of intelligence, strength and luck [Ion]