Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Must We Believe in Set Theory?' and 'Philosophy of Language'

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20 ideas

4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 1. Set Theory
The logic of ZF is classical first-order predicate logic with identity [Boolos]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / a. Axioms for sets
A few axioms of set theory 'force themselves on us', but most of them don't [Boolos]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 5. Conceptions of Set / d. Naïve logical sets
Naïve sets are inconsistent: there is no set for things that do not belong to themselves [Boolos]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 5. Conceptions of Set / e. Iterative sets
The iterative conception says sets are formed at stages; some are 'earlier', and must be formed first [Boolos]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / c. Names as referential
If the only property of a name was its reference, we couldn't explain bearerless names [Miller,A]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / a. The Infinite
Infinite natural numbers is as obvious as infinite sentences in English [Boolos]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / f. Uncountable infinities
Mathematics and science do not require very high orders of infinity [Boolos]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 1. Mathematical Platonism / a. For mathematical platonism
Mathematics isn't surprising, given that we experience many objects as abstract [Boolos]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 1. Universals
It is lunacy to think we only see ink-marks, and not word-types [Boolos]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 2. Abstract Objects / a. Nature of abstracta
I am a fan of abstract objects, and confident of their existence [Boolos]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 2. Abstract Objects / c. Modern abstracta
We deal with abstract objects all the time: software, poems, mistakes, triangles.. [Boolos]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 2. Types of Scepticism
Constitutive scepticism is about facts, and epistemological scepticism about our ability to know them [Miller,A]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 2. Potential Behaviour
Dispositions say what we will do, not what we ought to do, so can't explain normativity [Miller,A]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 1. Meaning
Explain meaning by propositional attitudes, or vice versa, or together? [Miller,A]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 6. Truth-Conditions Semantics
If truth is deflationary, sentence truth-conditions just need good declarative syntax [Miller,A]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 2. Analytic Truths
'Jones is a married bachelor' does not have the logical form of a contradiction [Miller,A]
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / c. Principle of charity
The principle of charity is holistic, saying we must hold most of someone's system of beliefs to be true [Miller,A]
Maybe we should interpret speakers as intelligible, rather than speaking truth [Miller,A]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / h. Expressivism
The Frege-Geach problem is that I can discuss the wrongness of murder without disapproval [Miller,A]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / a. Nature of virtue
A virtue is a combination of intelligence, strength and luck [Ion]