Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Value Theory' and 'Liberalism: the basics'

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42 ideas

7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / a. Nature of supervenience
To avoid misunderstandings supervenience is often expressed negatively: no A-change without B-change [Orsi]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / c. Reasons as causes
Rather than requiring an action, a reason may 'entice' us, or be 'eligible', or 'justify' it [Orsi]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / a. Nature of value
Value-maker concepts (such as courageous or elegant) simultaneously describe and evaluate [Orsi]
Final value is favoured for its own sake, and personal value for someone's sake [Orsi]
The '-able' concepts (like enviable) say this thing deserves a particular response [Orsi]
Things are only valuable if something makes it valuable, and we can ask for the reason [Orsi]
A complex value is not just the sum of the values of the parts [Orsi]
Trichotomy Thesis: comparable values must be better, worse or the same [Orsi]
The Fitting Attitude view says values are fitting or reasonable, and values are just byproducts [Orsi]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / c. Objective value
Values from reasons has the 'wrong kind of reason' problem - admiration arising from fear [Orsi]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / f. Ultimate value
A thing may have final value, which is still derived from other values, or from relations [Orsi]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / a. Normativity
Values can be normative in the Fitting Attitude account, where 'good' means fitting favouring [Orsi]
The Buck-Passing view of normative values says other properties are reasons for the value [Orsi]
Truths about value entail normative truths about actions or attitudes [Orsi]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / a. Nature of virtue
A virtue is a combination of intelligence, strength and luck [Ion]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 4. Original Position / a. Original position
Rawls's theory cannot justify liberalism, since it presupposes free and equal participants [Charvet]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 4. Original Position / b. Veil of ignorance
People with strong prior beliefs would have nothing to do with a veil of ignorance [Charvet]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 3. Conservatism
Societies need shared values, so conservatism is right if rational discussion of values is impossible [Charvet]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 4. Social Utilitarianism
The universalism of utilitarianism implies a world state [Charvet]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / a. Liberalism basics
Liberals value freedom and equality, but the society itself must decide on its values [Charvet]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / b. Liberal individualism
Modern libertarian societies still provide education and some housing [Charvet]
Liberalism needs people to either have equal autonomy, or everyone to have enough autonomy [Charvet]
Kant places a higher value on the universal rational will than on the people asserting it [Charvet]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / c. Liberal equality
Liberalism asserts maximum freedom, but that must be equal for all participants [Charvet]
Egalitarian liberals prefer equality (either of input or outcome) to liberty [Charvet]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / e. Liberal community
Liberals promote community and well-being - because all good societies need them [Charvet]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / f. Multiculturalism
Identity multiculturalism emerges from communitarianism, preferring community to humanity [Charvet]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 7. Communitarianism / b. Against communitarianism
For communitarians it seems that you must accept the culture you are born into [Charvet]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 9. Communism
Give by ability and receive by need, rather than a free labour market [Charvet]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 3. Free speech
Allowing defamatory speech is against society's interests, by blurring which people are trustworthy [Charvet]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 5. Freedom of lifestyle
'Freedom from' is an empty idea, if the freedom is not from impediments to my desires [Charvet]
Positive freedom can lead to coercion, if you are forced to do what you chose to do [Charvet]
First level autonomy is application of personal values; second level is criticising them [Charvet]
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 1. Grounds of equality
Mere equality, as in two trees being the same height, has no value at all [Charvet]
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 4. Economic equality
Inequalities are worse if they seem to be your fault, rather than social facts [Charvet]
Money allows unlimited inequalities, and we obviously all agree to money [Charvet]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 2. The Law / b. Rule of law
The rule of law mainly benefits those with property and liberties [Charvet]
The 1689 Bill of Rights denied the monarch new courts, or the right to sit as judge [Charvet]
The rule of law is mainly to restrict governments [Charvet]
Justice superior to the rule of law is claimed on behalf of the workers, or the will of the nation [Charvet]
From 1701 only parliament could remove judges, whose decisions could not be discussed [Charvet]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 3. Welfare provision
Welfare is needed if citizens are to accept the obligations of a liberal state [Charvet]