50 ideas
4456 | Epistemological Ockham's Razor demands good reasons, but the ontological version says reality is simple [Moreland] |
6961 | An analogy begins to break down as soon as the two cases differ [Hume] |
4474 | Existence theories must match experience, possibility, logic and knowledge, and not be self-defeating [Moreland] |
4461 | Tropes are like Hume's 'impressions', conceived as real rather than as ideal [Moreland] |
4463 | In 'four colours were used in the decoration', colours appear to be universals, not tropes [Moreland] |
4462 | A colour-trope cannot be simple (as required), because it is spread in space, and so it is complex [Moreland] |
4451 | If properties are universals, what distinguishes two things which have identical properties? [Moreland] |
4453 | One realism is one-over-many, which may be the model/copy view, which has the Third Man problem [Moreland] |
4464 | Realists see properties as universals, which are single abstract entities which are multiply exemplifiable [Moreland] |
4450 | The traditional problem of universals centres on the "One over Many", which is the unity of natural classes [Moreland] |
4449 | Evidence for universals can be found in language, communication, natural laws, classification and ideals [Moreland] |
4454 | The One-In-Many view says universals have abstract existence, but exist in particulars [Moreland] |
4452 | Maybe universals are real, if properties themselves have properties, and relate to other properties [Moreland] |
4467 | A naturalist and realist about universals is forced to say redness can be both moving and stationary [Moreland] |
4469 | There are spatial facts about red particulars, but not about redness itself [Moreland] |
4468 | How could 'being even', or 'being a father', or a musical interval, exist naturally in space? [Moreland] |
4472 | Redness is independent of red things, can do without them, has its own properties, and has identity [Moreland] |
4459 | Moderate nominalism attempts to embrace the existence of properties while avoiding universals [Moreland] |
4458 | Unlike Class Nominalism, Resemblance Nominalism can distinguish natural from unnatural classes [Moreland] |
4457 | There can be predicates with no property, and there are properties with no predicate [Moreland] |
4471 | We should abandon the concept of a property since (unlike sets) their identity conditions are unclear [Moreland] |
4476 | Most philosophers think that the identity of indiscernibles is false [Moreland] |
21285 | Events are baffling before experience, and obvious after experience [Hume] |
4460 | Abstractions are formed by the mind when it concentrates on some, but not all, the features of a thing [Moreland] |
4455 | It is always open to a philosopher to claim that some entity or other is unanalysable [Moreland] |
467 | A virtue is a combination of intelligence, strength and luck [Ion] |
4473 | 'Presentism' is the view that only the present moment exists [Moreland] |
6959 | We can't assume God's perfections are like our ideas or like human attributes [Hume] |
6957 | The objects of theological reasoning are too big for our minds [Hume] |
21255 | No being's non-existence can imply a contradiction, so its existence cannot be proved a priori [Hume] |
21254 | A chain of events requires a cause for the whole as well as the parts, yet the chain is just a sum of parts [Hume] |
1435 | If something must be necessary so that something exists rather than nothing, why can't the universe be necessary? [Hume] |
6962 | The thing which contains order must be God, so see God where you see order [Hume] |
6960 | Analogy suggests that God has a very great human mind [Hume] |
6958 | How can we pronounce on a whole after a brief look at a very small part? [Hume] |
21279 | If the divine cause is proportional to its effects, the effects are finite, so the Deity cannot be infinite [Hume] |
21282 | Design cannot prove a unified Deity. Many men make a city, so why not many gods for a world? [Hume] |
21280 | From a ship you would judge its creator a genius, not a mere humble workman [Hume] |
6966 | Creation is more like vegetation than human art, so it won't come from reason [Hume] |
21281 | This excellent world may be the result of a huge sequence of trial-and-error [Hume] |
21283 | Humans renew their species sexually. If there are many gods, would they not do the same? [Hume] |
21284 | This Creator god might be an infant or incompetent or senile [Hume] |
6967 | Order may come from an irrational source as well as a rational one [Hume] |
21286 | Motion often begins in matter, with no sign of a controlling agent [Hume] |
21287 | The universe could settle into superficial order, without a designer [Hume] |
21288 | Ideas arise from objects, not vice versa; ideas only influence matter if they are linked [Hume] |
21256 | A surprise feature of all products of 9 looks like design, but is actually a necessity [Hume] |
6963 | Why would we infer an infinite creator from a finite creation? [Hume] |
6965 | The universe may be the result of trial-and-error [Hume] |
6964 | From our limited view, we cannot tell if the universe is faulty [Hume] |