13 ideas
10631 | If 'x is heterological' iff it does not apply to itself, then 'heterological' is heterological if it isn't heterological [Hale/Wright] |
10624 | The incompletability of formal arithmetic reveals that logic also cannot be completely characterized [Hale/Wright] |
10629 | If structures are relative, this undermines truth-value and objectivity [Hale/Wright] |
10628 | The structural view of numbers doesn't fit their usage outside arithmetical contexts [Hale/Wright] |
10622 | The neo-Fregean is more optimistic than Frege about contextual definitions of numbers [Hale/Wright] |
18430 | We accept properties because of type/tokens, reference, and quantification [Edwards] |
18432 | Quineans say that predication is primitive and inexplicable [Edwards] |
18437 | Resemblance nominalism requires a second entity to explain 'the rose is crimson' [Edwards] |
10626 | Objects just are what singular terms refer to [Hale/Wright] |
18434 | That a whole is prior to its parts ('priority monism') is a view gaining in support [Edwards] |
10630 | Abstracted objects are not mental creations, but depend on equivalence between given entities [Hale/Wright] |
10627 | Many conceptual truths ('yellow is extended') are not analytic, as derived from logic and definitions [Hale/Wright] |
467 | A virtue is a combination of intelligence, strength and luck [Ion] |