39 ideas
| 21360 | Unobservant thinkers tend to dogmatise using insufficient facts [Aristotle] |
| 13212 | Infinity is only potential, never actual [Aristotle] |
| 13221 | Existence is either potential or actual [Aristotle] |
| 16100 | True change is in a thing's logos or its matter, not in its qualities [Aristotle] |
| 16101 | A change in qualities is mere alteration, not true change [Aristotle] |
| 12133 | If the substratum persists, it is 'alteration'; if it doesn't, it is 'coming-to-be' or 'passing-away' [Aristotle] |
| 13213 | All comings-to-be are passings-away, and vice versa [Aristotle] |
| 12132 | Indiscernibility is a necessary and sufficient condition for identity [Brody] |
| 15834 | Brody bases sortal essentialism on properties required throughout something's existence [Brody, by Mackie,P] |
| 12140 | Modern emphasis is on properties had essentially; traditional emphasis is on sort-defining properties [Brody] |
| 12134 | Matter is the substratum, which supports both coming-to-be and alteration [Aristotle] |
| 11895 | A sortal essence is a property which once possessed always possessed [Brody, by Mackie,P] |
| 12141 | Maybe essential properties are those which determine a natural kind? [Brody] |
| 12137 | De re essentialism standardly says all possible objects identical with a have a's essential properties [Brody] |
| 12142 | Essentially, a has P, always had P, must have had P, and has never had a future without P [Brody] |
| 12143 | An object having a property essentially is equivalent to its having it necessarily [Brody] |
| 12144 | Essentialism is justified if the essential properties of things explain their other properties [Brody] |
| 12139 | Mereological essentialism says that every part that ensures the existence is essential [Brody] |
| 16572 | Does the pure 'this' come to be, or the 'this-such', or 'so-great', or 'somewhere'? [Aristotle] |
| 16573 | Philosophers have worried about coming-to-be from nothing pre-existing [Aristotle] |
| 13214 | The substratum changing to a contrary is the material cause of coming-to-be [Aristotle] |
| 13215 | If a perceptible substratum persists, it is 'alteration'; coming-to-be is a complete change [Aristotle] |
| 12135 | Interrupted objects have two first moments of existence, which could be two beginnings [Brody] |
| 12130 | a and b share all properties; so they share being-identical-with-a; so a = b [Brody] |
| 12138 | Identity across possible worlds is prior to rigid designation [Brody] |
| 16717 | Which of the contrary features of a body are basic to it? [Aristotle] |
| 467 | A virtue is a combination of intelligence, strength and luck [Ion] |
| 13216 | Matter is the limit of points and lines, and must always have quality and form [Aristotle] |
| 17994 | The primary matter is the substratum for the contraries like hot and cold [Aristotle] |
| 13224 | There couldn't be just one element, which was both water and air at the same time [Aristotle] |
| 16594 | The Four Elements must change into one another, or else alteration is impossible [Aristotle] |
| 13223 | Fire is hot and dry; Air is hot and moist; Water is cold and moist; Earth is cold and dry [Aristotle] |
| 13210 | Wood is potentially divided through and through, so what is there in the wood besides the division? [Aristotle] |
| 13220 | Bodies are endlessly divisible [Aristotle] |
| 13211 | If a body is endlessly divided, is it reduced to nothing - then reassembled from nothing? [Aristotle] |
| 13228 | There is no time without movement [Aristotle] |
| 16595 | If each thing can cease to be, why hasn't absolutely everything ceased to be long ago? [Aristotle] |
| 13227 | Being is better than not-being [Aristotle] |
| 13226 | An Order controls all things [Aristotle] |