16 ideas
10653 | Maybe set theory need not be well-founded [Varzi] |
10648 | Mereology need not be nominalist, though it is often taken to be so [Varzi] |
10655 | Are there mereological atoms, and are all objects made of them? [Varzi] |
10659 | There is something of which everything is part, but no null-thing which is part of everything [Varzi] |
10661 | 'Composition is identity' says multitudes are the reality, loosely composing single things [Varzi] |
10654 | The parthood relation will help to define at least seven basic predicates [Varzi] |
10651 | If 'part' is reflexive, then identity is a limit case of parthood [Varzi] |
10649 | 'Part' stands for a reflexive, antisymmetric and transitive relation [Varzi] |
10647 | Parts may or may not be attached, demarcated, arbitrary, material, extended, spatial or temporal [Varzi] |
10658 | Sameness of parts won't guarantee identity if their arrangement matters [Varzi] |
10652 | Conceivability may indicate possibility, but literary fantasy does not [Varzi] |
5504 | Maybe we should see persons in four dimensions, with stages or time-slices at an instant [Martin/Barresi] |
5503 | Maybe personal identity is not vital in survival, and other continuations would suffice [Martin/Barresi] |
5502 | Locke's intrinsic view of personal identity has been replaced by an externalist view [Martin/Barresi] |
467 | A virtue is a combination of intelligence, strength and luck [Ion] |
5505 | For Aristotle the psyche perishes with the body (except possibly 'nous') [Martin/Barresi] |