50 ideas
15801 | Many philosophers aim to understand metaphysics by studying ourselves [Chisholm] |
15802 | I use variables to show that each item remains the same entity throughout [Chisholm] |
1848 | We are coerced into assent to a truth by reason's violence [Aquinas] |
1858 | The mind is compelled by necessary truths, but not by contingent truths [Aquinas] |
1852 | For the mind Good is one truth among many, and Truth is one good among many [Aquinas] |
15832 | Events are states of affairs that occur at certain places and times [Chisholm] |
15829 | The mark of a state of affairs is that it is capable of being accepted [Chisholm] |
15809 | A state of affairs pertains to a thing if it implies that it has some property [Chisholm] |
15828 | I propose that events and propositions are two types of states of affairs [Chisholm] |
15830 | Some properties can never be had, like being a round square [Chisholm] |
15827 | Some properties, such as 'being a widow', can be seen as 'rooted outside the time they are had' [Chisholm] |
15804 | If some dogs are brown, that entails the properties of 'being brown' and 'being canine' [Chisholm] |
15810 | Maybe we can only individuate things by relating them to ourselves [Chisholm] |
15805 | Being the tallest man is an 'individual concept', but not a haecceity [Chisholm] |
15807 | A haecceity is a property had necessarily, and strictly confined to one entity [Chisholm] |
15814 | A peach is sweet and fuzzy, but it doesn't 'have' those qualities [Chisholm] |
12852 | If x is ever part of y, then y is necessarily such that x is part of y at any time that y exists [Chisholm, by Simons] |
15808 | A traditional individual essence includes all of a thing's necessary characteristics [Chisholm] |
12851 | Intermittence is seen in a toy fort, which is dismantled then rebuilt with the same bricks [Chisholm, by Simons] |
15806 | The property of being identical with me is an individual concept [Chisholm] |
15826 | There is 'loose' identity between things if their properties, or truths about them, might differ [Chisholm] |
15819 | Do sense-data have structure, location, weight, and constituting matter? [Chisholm] |
15816 | 'I feel depressed' is more like 'he runs slowly' than like 'he has a red book' [Chisholm] |
15817 | If we can say a man senses 'redly', why not also 'rectangularly'? [Chisholm] |
15818 | So called 'sense-data' are best seen as 'modifications' of the person experiencing them [Chisholm] |
1860 | Knowledge may be based on senses, but we needn't sense all our knowledge [Aquinas] |
1556 | By nature people are close to one another, but culture drives them apart [Hippias] |
15831 | Explanations have states of affairs as their objects [Chisholm] |
15811 | I am picked out uniquely by my individual essence, which is 'being identical with myself' [Chisholm] |
15815 | Sartre says the ego is 'opaque'; I prefer to say that it is 'transparent' [Chisholm] |
15813 | People use 'I' to refer to themselves, with the meaning of their own individual essence [Chisholm] |
15803 | Bad theories of the self see it as abstract, or as a bundle, or as a process [Chisholm] |
1855 | If we saw something as totally and utterly good, we would be compelled to will it [Aquinas] |
1856 | Nothing can be willed except what is good, but good is very varied, and so choices are unpredictable [Aquinas] |
1862 | However habituated you are, given time to ponder you can go against a habit [Aquinas] |
1849 | Since will is a reasoning power, it can entertain opposites, so it is not compelled to embrace one of them [Aquinas] |
1861 | The will is not compelled to move, even if pleasant things are set before it [Aquinas] |
1853 | Because the will moves by examining alternatives, it doesn't compel itself to will [Aquinas] |
1854 | We must admit that when the will is not willing something, the first movement to will must come from outside the will [Aquinas] |
15821 | Determinism claims that every event has a sufficient causal pre-condition [Chisholm] |
1847 | The will must aim at happiness, but can choose the means [Aquinas] |
1857 | We don't have to will even perfect good, because we can choose not to think of it [Aquinas] |
1846 | The will can only want what it thinks is good [Aquinas] |
15824 | There are mere omissions (through ignorance, perhaps), and people can 'commit an omission' [Chisholm] |
1850 | Without free will not only is ethical action meaningless, but also planning, commanding, praising and blaming [Aquinas] |
1851 | Good applies to goals, just as truth applies to ideas in the mind [Aquinas] |
15822 | The concept of physical necessity is basic to both causation, and to the concept of nature [Chisholm] |
15823 | Some propose a distinct 'agent causation', as well as 'event causation' [Chisholm] |
1859 | Even a sufficient cause doesn't compel its effect, because interference could interrupt the process [Aquinas] |
15820 | A 'law of nature' is just something which is physically necessary [Chisholm] |