16 ideas
12312 | The real essence of a thing is its powers, or 'dispositional properties' [Copi] |
11181 | Aristotelian essentialism involves a 'natural' or 'causal' interpretation of modal operators [Marcus (Barcan)] |
11184 | Aristotelian essentialism is about shared properties, individuating essentialism about distinctive properties [Marcus (Barcan)] |
11180 | Essentialist sentences are not theorems of modal logic, and can even be false [Marcus (Barcan)] |
11186 | 'Essentially' won't replace 'necessarily' for vacuous properties like snub-nosed or self-identical [Marcus (Barcan)] |
11185 | 'Is essentially' has a different meaning from 'is necessarily', as they often cannot be substituted [Marcus (Barcan)] |
10937 | Essential properties are the 'deepest' ones which explain the others [Copi, by Rami] |
12308 | In modern science, nominal essence is intended to be real essence [Copi] |
11182 | If essences are objects with only essential properties, they are elusive in possible worlds [Marcus (Barcan)] |
12303 | Within the four types of change, essential attributes are those whose loss means destruction [Copi] |
11183 | The use of possible worlds is to sort properties (not to individuate objects) [Marcus (Barcan)] |
11187 | In possible worlds, names are just neutral unvarying pegs for truths and predicates [Marcus (Barcan)] |
1556 | By nature people are close to one another, but culture drives them apart [Hippias] |
12307 | Modern science seeks essences, and is getting closer to them [Copi] |
11189 | Dispositional essences are special, as if an object loses them they cease to exist [Marcus (Barcan)] |
12310 | Real essences are scientifically knowable, but so are non-essential properties [Copi] |