19 ideas
9208 | Philosophers with a new concept are like children with a new toy [Fine,K] |
18928 | If maximalism is necessary, then that nothing exists has a truthmaker, which it can't have [Cameron] |
18931 | Determinate truths don't need extra truthmakers, just truthmakers that are themselves determinate [Cameron] |
18932 | The facts about the existence of truthmakers can't have a further explanation [Cameron] |
18923 | The present property 'having been F' says nothing about a thing's intrinsic nature [Cameron] |
18926 | One temporal distibution property grounds our present and past truths [Cameron] |
18929 | We don't want present truthmakers for the past, if they are about to cease to exist! [Cameron] |
9210 | Possible objects are abstract; actual concrete objects are possible; so abstract/concrete are compatible [Fine,K] |
9211 | A non-standard realism, with no privileged standpoint, might challenge its absoluteness or coherence [Fine,K] |
18924 | Being polka-dotted is a 'spatial distribution' property [Cameron] |
9202 | Objects, as well as sentences, can have logical form [Fine,K] |
9206 | We must distinguish between the identity or essence of an object, and its necessary features [Fine,K] |
18930 | Change is instantiation of a non-uniform distributional property, like 'being red-then-orange' [Cameron] |
9205 | The three basic types of necessity are metaphysical, natural and normative [Fine,K] |
9209 | Metaphysical necessity may be 'whatever the circumstance', or 'regardless of circumstances' [Fine,K] |
9200 | Empiricists suspect modal notions: either it happens or it doesn't; it is just regularities. [Fine,K] |
1556 | By nature people are close to one another, but culture drives them apart [Hippias] |
9207 | If sentence content is all worlds where it is true, all necessary truths have the same content! [Fine,K] |
18927 | Surely if things extend over time, then time itself must be extended? [Cameron] |