27 ideas
2510 | Traditionally philosophy is an a priori enquiry into general truths about reality [Katz] |
2516 | Most of philosophy begins where science leaves off [Katz] |
17729 | Examining concepts can recover information obtained through the senses [Jenkins] |
17740 | Instead of correspondence of proposition to fact, look at correspondence of its parts [Jenkins] |
17730 | Combining the concepts of negation and finiteness gives the concept of infinity [Jenkins] |
2521 | 'Real' maths objects have no causal role, no determinate reference, and no abstract/concrete distinction [Katz] |
17719 | Arithmetic concepts are indispensable because they accurately map the world [Jenkins] |
17717 | Senses produce concepts that map the world, and arithmetic is known through these concepts [Jenkins] |
17724 | It is not easy to show that Hume's Principle is analytic or definitive in the required sense [Jenkins] |
17727 | We can learn about the world by studying the grounding of our concepts [Jenkins] |
17720 | There's essential, modal, explanatory, conceptual, metaphysical and constitutive dependence [Jenkins, by PG] |
17728 | The concepts we have to use for categorising are ones which map the real world well [Jenkins] |
2513 | We don't have a clear enough sense of meaning to pronounce some sentences meaningless or just analytic [Katz] |
17726 | Examining accurate, justified or grounded concepts brings understanding of the world [Jenkins] |
2522 | Experience cannot teach us why maths and logic are necessary [Katz] |
17734 | It is not enough that intuition be reliable - we need to know why it is reliable [Jenkins] |
17723 | Knowledge is true belief which can be explained just by citing the proposition believed [Jenkins] |
1556 | By nature people are close to one another, but culture drives them apart [Hippias] |
17718 | Grounded concepts are trustworthy maps of the world [Jenkins] |
17739 | The physical effect of world on brain explains the concepts we possess [Jenkins] |
2517 | Structuralists see meaning behaviouristically, and Chomsky says nothing about it [Katz] |
17731 | Verificationism is better if it says meaningfulness needs concepts grounded in the senses [Jenkins] |
2519 | It is generally accepted that sense is defined as the determiner of reference [Katz] |
17732 | Success semantics explains representation in terms of success in action [Jenkins] |
2520 | Sense determines meaning and synonymy, not referential properties like denotation and truth [Katz] |
2518 | Sentences are abstract types (like musical scores), not individual tokens [Katz] |
17725 | 'Analytic' can be conceptual, or by meaning, or predicate inclusion, or definition... [Jenkins] |