16 ideas
11257 | The Pythagoreans were the first to offer definitions [Politis, by Politis] |
11235 | 'True of' is applicable to things, while 'true' is applicable to words [Politis] |
12204 | The logic of metaphysical necessity is S5 [Rumfitt] |
12195 | Soundness in argument varies with context, and may be achieved very informally indeed [Rumfitt] |
12199 | There is a modal element in consequence, in assessing reasoning from suppositions [Rumfitt] |
12201 | We reject deductions by bad consequence, so logical consequence can't be deduction [Rumfitt] |
12194 | Contradictions include 'This is red and not coloured', as well as the formal 'B and not-B' [Rumfitt] |
12198 | Geometrical axioms in logic are nowadays replaced by inference rules (which imply the logical truths) [Rumfitt] |
11277 | Maybe 'What is being? is confusing because we can't ask what non-being is like [Politis] |
11248 | Necessary truths can be two-way relational, where essential truths are one-way or intrinsic [Politis] |
14532 | A distinctive type of necessity is found in logical consequence [Rumfitt, by Hale/Hoffmann,A] |
12193 | Logical necessity is when 'necessarily A' implies 'not-A is contradictory' [Rumfitt] |
12200 | A logically necessary statement need not be a priori, as it could be unknowable [Rumfitt] |
12202 | Narrow non-modal logical necessity may be metaphysical, but real logical necessity is not [Rumfitt] |
12203 | If a world is a fully determinate way things could have been, can anyone consider such a thing? [Rumfitt] |
20239 | Unlike us, the early Greeks thought envy was a good thing, and hope a bad thing [Hesiod, by Nietzsche] |