17 ideas
15134 | The truthmaker principle requires some specific named thing to make the difference [Williamson] |
15140 | The converse Barcan formula will not allow contingent truths to have truthmakers [Williamson] |
15141 | Truthmaker is incompatible with modal semantics of varying domains [Williamson] |
17990 | Instances of minimal truth miss out propositions inexpressible in current English [Hofweber] |
15131 | If metaphysical possibility is not a contingent matter, then S5 seems to suit it best [Williamson] |
15135 | If the domain of propositional quantification is constant, the Barcan formulas hold [Williamson] |
15139 | Converse Barcan: could something fail to meet a condition, if everything meets that condition? [Williamson] |
18492 | Not all quantification is either objectual or substitutional [Williamson] |
15136 | Substitutional quantification is metaphysical neutral, and equivalent to a disjunction of instances [Williamson] |
17988 | Quantification can't all be substitutional; some reference is obviously to objects [Hofweber] |
15138 | Not all quantification is objectual or substitutional [Williamson] |
15137 | If 'fact' is a noun, can we name the fact that dogs bark 'Mary'? [Williamson] |
17989 | Since properties have properties, there can be a typed or a type-free theory of them [Hofweber] |
15142 | Our ability to count objects across possibilities favours the Barcan formulas [Williamson] |
17991 | Holism says language can't be translated; the expressibility hypothesis says everything can [Hofweber] |
20239 | Unlike us, the early Greeks thought envy was a good thing, and hope a bad thing [Hesiod, by Nietzsche] |
15133 | A thing can't be the only necessary existent, because its singleton set would be as well [Williamson] |