15 ideas
| 22138 | Science rests on scholastic metaphysics, not on Hume, Kant or Carnap [Boulter] |
| 19463 | Induction assumes some uniformity in nature, or that in some respects the future is like the past [Ayer] |
| 22134 | Thoughts are general, but the world isn't, so how can we think accurately? [Boulter] |
| 22150 | Logical possibility needs the concepts of the proposition to be adequate [Boulter] |
| 19459 | To say 'I am not thinking' must be false, but it might have been true, so it isn't self-contradictory [Ayer] |
| 19460 | 'I know I exist' has no counterevidence, so it may be meaningless [Ayer] |
| 19461 | Knowing I exist reveals nothing at all about my nature [Ayer] |
| 22139 | Experiments don't just observe; they look to see what interventions change the natural order [Boulter] |
| 19464 | We only discard a hypothesis after one failure if it appears likely to keep on failing [Ayer] |
| 22136 | Science begins with sufficient reason, de-animation, and the importance of nature [Boulter] |
| 19462 | Induction passes from particular facts to other particulars, or to general laws, non-deductively [Ayer] |
| 22135 | Our concepts can never fully capture reality, but simplification does not falsify [Boulter] |
| 22152 | Aristotelians accept the analytic-synthetic distinction [Boulter] |
| 22156 | The facts about human health are the measure of the values in our lives [Boulter] |
| 20239 | Unlike us, the early Greeks thought envy was a good thing, and hope a bad thing [Hesiod, by Nietzsche] |