28 ideas
18365 | If truths are just identical with facts, then truths will make themselves true [David] |
18335 | There are five problems which the truth-maker theory might solve [Rami] |
18334 | The truth-maker idea is usually justified by its explanatory power, or intuitive appeal [Rami] |
18339 | The truth-making relation can be one-to-one, or many-to-many [Rami] |
18362 | Examples show that truth-making is just non-symmetric, not asymmetric [David] |
18333 | Central idea: truths need truthmakers; and possibly all truths have them, and makers entail truths [Rami] |
18360 | It is assumed that a proposition is necessarily true if its truth-maker exists [David] |
18342 | Most theorists say that truth-makers necessitate their truths [Rami] |
18340 | It seems best to assume different kinds of truth-maker, such as objects, facts, tropes, or events [Rami] |
18358 | Two different propositions can have the same fact as truth-maker [David] |
18355 | What matters is truth-making (not truth-makers) [David] |
18341 | Truth-makers seem to be states of affairs (plus optional individuals), or individuals and properties [Rami] |
18346 | 'Truth supervenes on being' only gives necessary (not sufficient) conditions for contingent truths [Rami] |
18345 | 'Truth supervenes on being' avoids entities as truth-makers for negative truths [Rami] |
18343 | Maybe a truth-maker also works for the entailments of the given truth [Rami] |
18354 | Correspondence is symmetric, while truth-making is taken to be asymmetric [David] |
18356 | Correspondence is an over-ambitious attempt to explain truth-making [David] |
18363 | Correspondence theorists see facts as the only truth-makers [David] |
18338 | Truth-making is usually internalist, but the correspondence theory is externalist [Rami] |
18364 | Correspondence theory likes ideal languages, that reveal the structure of propositions [David] |
18337 | Correspondence theories assume that truth is a representation relation [Rami] |
18357 | What makes a disjunction true is simpler than the disjunctive fact it names [David] |
18359 | One proposition can be made true by many different facts [David] |
18347 | Deflationist truth is an infinitely disjunctive property [Rami] |
18350 | Truth-maker theorists should probably reject the converse Barcan formula [Rami] |
18336 | Internal relations depend either on the existence of the relata, or on their properties [Rami] |
18361 | A reflexive relation entails that the relation can't be asymmetric [David] |
20239 | Unlike us, the early Greeks thought envy was a good thing, and hope a bad thing [Hesiod, by Nietzsche] |