78 ideas
| 24146 | All the major problems were formulated before Socrates [Nietzsche] |
| 15357 | Philosophy is the most general intellectual discipline [Horsten] |
| 24142 | What matters is how humans can be developed [Nietzsche] |
| 24143 | Thinkers might agree some provisional truths, as methodological assumptions [Nietzsche] |
| 24125 | Aristotle enjoyed the sham generalities of a system, as the peak of happiness! [Nietzsche] |
| 24147 | Thoughts are uncertain, and are just occasions for interpretation [Nietzsche] |
| 15352 | A definition should allow the defined term to be eliminated [Horsten] |
| 15324 | Semantic theories of truth seek models; axiomatic (syntactic) theories seek logical principles [Horsten] |
| 15323 | Truth is a property, because the truth predicate has an extension [Horsten] |
| 15374 | Truth has no 'nature', but we should try to describe its behaviour in inferences [Horsten] |
| 15348 | Propositions have sentence-like structures, so it matters little which bears the truth [Horsten] |
| 15333 | Modern correspondence is said to be with the facts, not with true propositions [Horsten] |
| 15337 | The correspondence 'theory' is too vague - about both 'correspondence' and 'facts' [Horsten] |
| 15334 | The coherence theory allows multiple coherent wholes, which could contradict one another [Horsten] |
| 15336 | The pragmatic theory of truth is relative; useful for group A can be useless for group B [Horsten] |
| 15354 | Tarski's hierarchy lacks uniform truth, and depends on contingent factors [Horsten] |
| 15340 | Tarski Bi-conditional: if you'll assert φ you'll assert φ-is-true - and also vice versa [Horsten] |
| 15345 | Semantic theories have a regress problem in describing truth in the languages for the models [Horsten] |
| 15373 | Axiomatic approaches avoid limiting definitions to avoid the truth predicate, and limited sizes of models [Horsten] |
| 15332 | 'Reflexive' truth theories allow iterations (it is T that it is T that p) [Horsten] |
| 15346 | Axiomatic approaches to truth avoid the regress problem of semantic theories [Horsten] |
| 15361 | A good theory of truth must be compositional (as well as deriving biconditionals) [Horsten] |
| 15371 | An axiomatic theory needs to be of maximal strength, while being natural and sound [Horsten] |
| 15350 | The Naďve Theory takes the bi-conditionals as axioms, but it is inconsistent, and allows the Liar [Horsten] |
| 15351 | Axiomatic theories take truth as primitive, and propose some laws of truth as axioms [Horsten] |
| 15367 | By adding truth to Peano Arithmetic we increase its power, so truth has mathematical content! [Horsten] |
| 15330 | Friedman-Sheard theory keeps classical logic and aims for maximum strength [Horsten] |
| 15331 | Kripke-Feferman has truth gaps, instead of classical logic, and aims for maximum strength [Horsten] |
| 15325 | Inferential deflationism says truth has no essence because no unrestricted logic governs the concept [Horsten] |
| 15344 | Deflationism skips definitions and models, and offers just accounts of basic laws of truth [Horsten] |
| 15356 | Deflationism concerns the nature and role of truth, but not its laws [Horsten] |
| 15368 | This deflationary account says truth has a role in generality, and in inference [Horsten] |
| 15358 | Deflationism says truth isn't a topic on its own - it just concerns what is true [Horsten] |
| 15359 | Deflation: instead of asserting a sentence, we can treat it as an object with the truth-property [Horsten] |
| 15329 | Nonclassical may accept T/F but deny applicability, or it may deny just T or F as well [Horsten] |
| 15326 | Doubt is thrown on classical logic by the way it so easily produces the liar paradox [Horsten] |
| 15341 | Deduction Theorem: ψ only derivable from φ iff φ→ψ are axioms [Horsten] |
| 24137 | Mathematics is just accurate inferences from definitions, and doesn't involve objects [Nietzsche] |
| 15328 | A theory is 'non-conservative' if it facilitates new mathematical proofs [Horsten] |
| 15349 | It is easier to imagine truth-value gaps (for the Liar, say) than for truth-value gluts (both T and F) [Horsten] |
| 15366 | Satisfaction is a primitive notion, and very liable to semantical paradoxes [Horsten] |
| 15353 | The first incompleteness theorem means that consistency does not entail soundness [Horsten] |
| 15355 | Strengthened Liar: 'this sentence is not true in any context' - in no context can this be evaluated [Horsten] |
| 15364 | English expressions are denumerably infinite, but reals are nondenumerable, so many are unnameable [Horsten] |
| 15360 | ZFC showed that the concept of set is mathematical, not logical, because of its existence claims [Horsten] |
| 15369 | Set theory is substantial over first-order arithmetic, because it enables new proofs [Horsten] |
| 15370 | Predicativism says mathematical definitions must not include the thing being defined [Horsten] |
| 24131 | There is no 'being'; it is just the opposition to nothingness [Nietzsche] |
| 24151 | I only want thinking that is anchored in body, senses and earth [Nietzsche] |
| 15338 | We may believe in atomic facts, but surely not complex disjunctive ones? [Horsten] |
| 15362 | If 'Italy is large' lacks truth, so must 'Italy is not large'; but classical logic says it's large or it isn't [Horsten] |
| 15363 | In the supervaluationist account, disjunctions are not determined by their disjuncts [Horsten] |
| 24150 | We can only understand through concepts, which subsume particulars in generalities [Nietzsche] |
| 15372 | Some claim that indicative conditionals are believed by people, even though they are not actually held true [Horsten] |
| 24138 | Strongly believed a priori is not certain; it may just be a feature of our existence [Nietzsche] |
| 24130 | An affirmative belief is present in every basic sense impression [Nietzsche] |
| 24124 | We now have innumerable perspectives to draw on [Nietzsche] |
| 24145 | Mind is a mechanism of abstraction and simplification, aimed at control [Nietzsche] |
| 24144 | A cognitive mechanism wanting to know itself is absurd! [Nietzsche] |
| 24139 | A 'person' is just one possible abstraction from a bundle of qualities [Nietzsche] |
| 24133 | I have perfected fatalism, as recurrence and denial of the will [Nietzsche] |
| 24152 | Fate is inspiring, if you understand you are part of it [Nietzsche] |
| 24129 | We start with images, then words, and then concepts, to which emotions attach [Nietzsche] |
| 15347 | A theory of syntax can be based on Peano arithmetic, thanks to the translation by Gödel coding [Horsten] |
| 24127 | Judging actions by intentions - like judging painters by their thoughts! [Nietzsche] |
| 24149 | Values need a perspective, of preserving some aspect of life [Nietzsche] |
| 24148 | If you love something, it is connected with everything, so all must be affirmed as good [Nietzsche] |
| 24135 | Egoism should not assume that all egos are equal [Nietzsche] |
| 24132 | After Socrates virtue is misunderstood, as good for all, not for individuals [Nietzsche] |
| 24126 | We contain multitudes of characters, which can brought into the open [Nietzsche] |
| 20239 | Unlike us, the early Greeks thought envy was a good thing, and hope a bad thing [Hesiod, by Nietzsche] |
| 24136 | Who can endure the thought of eternal recurrence? [Nietzsche] |
| 24154 | If you want one experience repeated, you must want all of them [Nietzsche] |
| 24153 | Humans are determined by community, so its preservation is their most valued drive [Nietzsche] |
| 24134 | There is always slavery, whether we like it or not [Nietzsche] |
| 24128 | After history following God, or a people, or an idea, we now see it in terms of animals [Nietzsche] |
| 24140 | Cause and effect is a hypothesis, based on our supposed willing of actions [Nietzsche] |
| 24141 | Having a sense of time presupposes absolute time [Nietzsche] |