11 ideas
| 10528 | Definitions concern how we should speak, not how things are [Fine,K] |
| 19463 | Induction assumes some uniformity in nature, or that in some respects the future is like the past [Ayer] |
| 10529 | If Hume's Principle can define numbers, we needn't worry about its truth [Fine,K] |
| 10530 | Hume's Principle is either adequate for number but fails to define properly, or vice versa [Fine,K] |
| 19459 | To say 'I am not thinking' must be false, but it might have been true, so it isn't self-contradictory [Ayer] |
| 19460 | 'I know I exist' has no counterevidence, so it may be meaningless [Ayer] |
| 19461 | Knowing I exist reveals nothing at all about my nature [Ayer] |
| 19464 | We only discard a hypothesis after one failure if it appears likely to keep on failing [Ayer] |
| 19462 | Induction passes from particular facts to other particulars, or to general laws, non-deductively [Ayer] |
| 10527 | An abstraction principle should not 'inflate', producing more abstractions than objects [Fine,K] |
| 20239 | Unlike us, the early Greeks thought envy was a good thing, and hope a bad thing [Hesiod, by Nietzsche] |