Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'works', 'Freedom of the Will and concept of a person' and 'Number Determiners, Numbers, Arithmetic'

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18 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / d. Singular terms
10001 An adjective contributes semantically to a noun phrase [Hofweber]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 2. Domain of Quantification
10007 Quantifiers for domains and for inference come apart if there are no entities [Hofweber]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / a. Numbers
9998 What is the relation of number words as singular-terms, adjectives/determiners, and symbols? [Hofweber]
10002 '2 + 2 = 4' can be read as either singular or plural [Hofweber]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 1. Mathematical Platonism / a. For mathematical platonism
10003 Why is arithmetic hard to learn, but then becomes easy? [Hofweber]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 1. Mathematical Platonism / b. Against mathematical platonism
10008 Arithmetic is not about a domain of entities, as the quantifiers are purely inferential [Hofweber]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / c. Against mathematical empiricism
10005 Arithmetic doesn’t simply depend on objects, since it is true of fictional objects [Hofweber]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 5. Numbers as Adjectival
10000 We might eliminate adjectival numbers by analysing them into blocks of quantifiers [Hofweber]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / d. Logicism critique
10006 First-order logic captures the inferential relations of numbers, but not the semantics [Hofweber]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 4. Objectification
10004 Our minds are at their best when reasoning about objects [Hofweber]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 6. Self as Higher Awareness
9264 Persons are distinguished by a capacity for second-order desires [Frankfurt]
9266 A person essentially has second-order volitions, and not just second-order desires [Frankfurt]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 1. Nature of Free Will
9267 Free will is the capacity to choose what sort of will you have [Frankfurt]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / a. Will to Act
9265 The will is the effective desire which actually leads to an action [Frankfurt]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / c. Agent causation
20015 Freedom of action needs the agent to identify with their reason for acting [Frankfurt, by Wilson/Schpall]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / g. Moral responsibility
9270 A 'wanton' is not a person, because they lack second-order volitions [Frankfurt]
9269 A person may be morally responsible without free will [Frankfurt]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
20239 Unlike us, the early Greeks thought envy was a good thing, and hope a bad thing [Hesiod, by Nietzsche]