12 ideas
| 9264 | Persons are distinguished by a capacity for second-order desires [Frankfurt] |
| 9266 | A person essentially has second-order volitions, and not just second-order desires [Frankfurt] |
| 9267 | Free will is the capacity to choose what sort of will you have [Frankfurt] |
| 9265 | The will is the effective desire which actually leads to an action [Frankfurt] |
| 20015 | Freedom of action needs the agent to identify with their reason for acting [Frankfurt, by Wilson/Schpall] |
| 9270 | A 'wanton' is not a person, because they lack second-order volitions [Frankfurt] |
| 9269 | A person may be morally responsible without free will [Frankfurt] |
| 4581 | Virtues and vices are like secondary qualities in perception, found in observers, not objects [Hume] |
| 4580 | All virtues benefit either the public, or the individual who possesses them [Hume] |
| 20239 | Unlike us, the early Greeks thought envy was a good thing, and hope a bad thing [Hesiod, by Nietzsche] |
| 4579 | The idea of a final cause is very uncertain and unphilosophical [Hume] |
| 20705 | That events could be uncaused is absurd; I only say intuition and demonstration don't show this [Hume] |